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  10PREAMBLE  
This inaugural lecture is taking place at a time that I should probably be thinking of a 
valedictory lecture. The lecture should have come much earlier at the time that my 
contemporaries delivered theirs in the 1990s. But that was the time I was away from the 
University, for a long period, on a national assignment in the Federal Public Service. 
Consequently, when I was reminded about the lecture this year, I was rather hesitant against the 
backdrop of probably an erroneous belief that the essence of the lecture had been overtaken by 
events. But then, friends and well-wishers convinced me to the contrary. I deeply appreciate their 
concerns. And so, here I am today to deliver the ‘inaugural’ lecture. Perhaps, one advantage that 
lateness has conferred on me is the opportunity to present a rather robust lecture and what we 
have seems worthwhile to me. As a development economist and an international 
macroeconomist, I have chosen to dwell on the theme, “Economic Globalization, Markets and 
National Development: How Sensibly do the Poor Countries
1 (Nigeria included) Stand?” This is 
a theme that captures the essence of some  of my major works.  
Perhaps, I should apologise to all those of you good people who are imbued with a high dose 
of nationalism and who may feel offended when I say that Nigeria is a poor country. By many 
indicators, Nigeria is indeed a poor country. It is true that Nigeria is rich in all kinds of 
resources- natural, human, material and even spiritual resources such that every other house is a 
church and every other man or woman is a pastor. In this perspective, Nigeria is rich but its 
people are poor such that the country continues to epitomize the cliché of poverty in the midst of 
plenty. Out of the country’s 140 million people, 76 million live on less than one US dollar a day 
(about  N120.00) and about 90 per cent of the population or 127 million people live on less than 
2 US dollars a day. Even the World Bank, using per capita income, classifies Nigeria as one of 
the 33 poor countries in Africa out of the 54 poor countries in the world. And since the UNDP 
started producing the Human Development Index in 1990, Nigeria’s index has hovered around 
the low and uncomfortable figure of 0.439, thus putting the country in the category of  least 
developed countries. The very bad governance foisted on the country by Nigerian rulers has 
created the pitiable condition in which our country finds itself today.  
                                                 
1 Out of the 54 countries that the World Bank classifies as low-income or poor countries 33 are in Africa, Nigeria 
included. These are countries with gross national income per capita of US$ 875.00 or less in 2005. In that year, 
Nigeria’s per capita income was only US$ 560.00. In 2006, it was USD 774.00. The different categories of countries 
according to income classification are in Annex 1. 
  11My approach in this lecture is not to list my works and the outlets in which they have been 
published. Rather, a standard presentation which is educative will be made and my works, 
among others, will be cited as appropriate in support of points being made. Such relevant works 
of mine, sixty-six of them, are included in the “References Section” with full details.   
Now, it is my great pleasure to present the lecture, with the following structure:  
•  A brief Historical Perspective, Concepts and Drivers of Globalization. 
•  Globalization and Markets. 
•  Globalization and Trade Liberalization 
•  Global Economic Integration and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
•  Nigeria and the Global Economy. 
•  Appropriate Policy Responses and Lessons. 
•  Concluding  Remarks  
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1.  CONCEPT AND DRIVERS OF GLOBALIZATION 
1.0      Introduction – A  Brief  Historical Perspective  
Globalization has become the economic buzz word since the 1990s. But there seems to be 
a consensus that it is not a new phenomenon (See, for example, UNDP, 1999; Ajayi, 2001; 
James, 1999; Mussa, 2000; Mason, 2001; IMF, 2002). It has been argued that globalization has 
proceeded throughout the course of recorded history, though not in a steady and linear fashion 
(Mason, 2001). However, it is generally acknowledged that modern globalization commenced in 
the last quarter of the 19
th century and has occurred in three phases (World Bank, 2002). The first 
wave of globalization spans the period, 1870 – 1913. This period saw large cross-border flows of 
goods, capital and people. By the end of the 19
th century the world was already highly globalized 
with significant volumes of trade accompanied by unprecedented capital flows (Aninat, 2002; 
James, 1999). However, the earlier attempt at modern globalization ended abruptly with the 
outbreak of World War I. Consequently, the period encompassing World War I, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and World War II marked a giant step back in globalization or global 
economic integration. The Second Wave of modern globalization began after World War II and 
ended in 1980. The period was one that focused on integration among the rich countries (World 
Bank, 2002a) and it was characterized by lower trade barriers and further developments in 
transportation technology and reduction of costs. The Third and most recent wave of 
globalization started around 1980 and continues till today. It has been reinvigorated by the 
unprecedented ease with which information can be exchanged and processed as a result of 
breakthroughs in computer and telecommunications technologies. Thus, the phenomenon of 
globalization is not new. But, in recent years, as Obadan (2003) has observed, the phenomenon 
has intensified in its ramifications and become a very important issue for discussion in various 
fora. The present era has the distinctive features of shrinking space, shrinking time and 
disappearing borders which are linking people’s lives more deeply, more immediately than ever 
before (UNDP, 1999). There has also been unprecedented global economic integration.  
In recent years, too, globalization has acquired considerable emotive force (IMF Staff, 
2002), being associated, rightly or wrongly, with most of the major issues and challenges 
currently engaging the world’s attention. It is further seen through ideological prisms, being 
associated with laissez capitalism or market fundamentalism (Kiggundu, 2002). Indeed, 
  13globalization has inextricably been linked with the neoliberal economic policies, forcefully 
propagated in the last three decades by the Bretton Woods Institutions- the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
2 and manifested in unleashing market forces, deregulation of 
economic activities, trade and financial markets liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, minimizing the role of the state, among others (Obadan, 2003a). According to 
Obadan (2001a), until the emerging market financial crisis, reflected in the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997/98 and Mexican financial crisis of 1994/95, the phenomenon of globalization was 
spreading like wild fire, and with numerous implications for both developed and developing 
countries. Those crises put the growing interdependencies among countries in the spotlight and 
led to their intense scrutiny (World Bank, 2000). Nevertheless, globalization has remained a 
powerful force shaping world economies for good or for ill.  
1.1  Concept of Globalization 
But then, what is globalization? Globalization has tended to mean different things to 
different people and different things to the same people across time and space (Fischer, 2000)). 
Consequently, very many definitions of globalization have been proffered relating to its nature, 
extensiveness, causes, consequences, etc (See, for example, Fischer, 2000; UNDP (Nigeria), 
1999; Robinson, 2001; Walker and Fox, 1999; Caselli, 2004). Although Caselli is of the view 
that “we still await a definition of the phenomenon (globalization) which meets the approval of 
the majority of scholars”, his own definition provides a fairly comprehensive view of the 
phenomenon. To him, globalization is a set of processes which (a) increases the number and 
heighten the intensity of contacts, relations, exchanges and dependence and interdependence 
relationships among various parts of the world; (b) transforms the importance of ‘space’ and 
‘time’ with respect to those relations and relationships; (c) increase and spread awareness among 
the planet’s inhabitants of the existence of those relations and relationships, as well as of their 
importance for their personal lives” (Caselli, 2004). And Fischer (2000) observes that to 
economists, globalization means “the on-going trend toward greater economic integration among 
nations” while in terms of people’s daily lives, it “means that the residents of one country are 
more likely now: to consume the products of another country; to talk on the telephone to people 
                                                 
2 The IMF and the World Bank are the two international financial institutions established by the world economic 
powers in Bretton Woods, U.S.A, after the end of World War II. The IMF was to promote international payments 
equilibrium while the focus of the World Bank was international reconstruction and development of national 
economies. 
  14in other countries; to visit other countries; and quite likely to know more about other countries 
than they were fifty years ago”. The different perspectives on globalization notwithstanding, a 
common thread runs through most of them, to the effect that globalization relates to the growing 
interdependence of the world’s people. It is about increasing inter-connectedness and 
interdependencies among the world’s regions, nations, governments, businesses, institutions, 
communities, families and individuals. Globalization fosters the advancement of a “global 
mentality” and conjures the picture of a borderless world through the use of information 
technology to create partnerships to foster greater financial and economic integration.  
However, globalization is not just an economic phenomenon which integrates world 
economies but also of culture, technology and governance. It also has religious, environmental 
and social dimensions. In other words, globalization is multi faceted (Daouas, 2001; Obadan, 
2001b and 2002b; IMF Staff, 2002; UNDP(Nigeria), 2001, etc). National policy-making has also 
been globalized as a result of the liberalisation of financial markets, developments in technology 
and the activities of global institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Khor, 2000; Obadan and Obioma, 1999). Of the other dimensions of 
globalization, cultural globalization has elicited/emotional reactions and controversy. No doubt, 
the globalization of culture allows people to experiment with alternative models of development 
while at the same time borrowing ideas and practices from other cultures and institutions. But 
there is the fear that cultural globalization would drive out weak or less competitive cultures, 
sacrifice cultural diversity and creativity and impose a universal monocultural world. Indeed, 
Giddens (2000) sees globalization as “destroying cultures, widening world inequalities and 
worsening the lot of the impoverished”. Kiggundu (2002) has, however, argued that the available 
evidence suggests that the fears on culture were largely exaggerated and that globalization can 
be, and, in most cases, has been good for cultural creativity, diversity and development. 
Nevertheless, the negative aspects of globalization, notably the cultural aspect, appear to have, in 
recent years, spurred the violent protests in some parts of the world, particularly, in the United 
States of America and Western Europe, against the forces and institutions of globalization. Even 
Osama Bin Laden, the Islamic crusader, has the negative cultural aspects of globalization as one 
of his grouses against the West (Obadan, 2002b). Many demonstrations express concerns about 
the effect of trade on jobs and the environment. 
  15What has become clear, however, is that the various dimensions of globalization affect 
people, institutions and countries in one way or another, positively or negatively. This is, 
perhaps, why some view globalization as a process that is beneficial – a key to future world 
economic development – and also inevitable and irreversible. But others regard it with hostility, 
even fear, believing that it increases inequality within and between nations, threatens 
employment and living standards and thwarts social progress (IMF Staff, 2002). The World 
Bank (2002) concedes that globalization produces winners and losers, both between countries 
and within countries.  
1.2  Economic Globalization  
Although the political, cultural, social and environmental aspects of globalization are no 
doubt important, the economic aspect is perceived to be at the heart of the (globalization) 
process. According to Robinson (2001), “the fulcrum of the various definitions of globalization 
seems to be wealth or economic development. The parameters within which many schools of 
thought view globalization is usually based on trade or economic activity”. Economic 
globalization has tended to receive greater attention, especially in view of its rapid pace since the 
past five decades (Obadan, 2003b). Economic globalization refers to the process of change 
towards greater international economic integration through trade, financial flows, exchange of 
technology and information, and movement of people (Mason, 2001; IMF Staff, 2002; UNDP, 
1999, etc). The most dramatic features of economic globalization are liberalisation of trade in 
goods and services and increasingly unrestricted flow of capital (James, 1999). Indeed, openness 
and markets constitute the platforms of economic globalization while trade, finance and 
investment, and entrepreneurs are the heart (Kiggundu, 2002). The countries most active and 
benefiting most from globalization are the same ones with the largest share of global trade and 
investment. Trade and investment remain the principal key for creating and distributing wealth 
among and within nations. This means that countries lacking the institutional capacity for global 
trade and investment find it difficult to meaningfully participate in economic globalization and 
reap the benefits thereof.  
According to Obadan and Obioma (1999), economic globalization has produced a world 
economy, characterized by trade liberalisation, spread of international trade, financial and 
production activities, integration of financial markets, the growing power of transnational 
corporations and international financial institutions and their monopolization of economic 
  16resources, and rapid diffusion of advanced technologies and consumption patterns. Thus, under 
economic globalization, most economies witness rapid integration of productive and investment 
decisions across the globe, increasing breakdown of trading and investment barriers, emergence 
of truly global companies with vast capital base, rising share of international trade in world 
output, and heightened capital mobility. There has also been the widening and intensification of 
links between the economies of the industrial and developing countries through trade, finance, 
investment, technology and migration.  
The integration of financial markets or globalization of finance has been a very 
significant aspect of economic globalization. It has also turned out to be very controversial 
(Obadan, 2005a and 2005b). Financial globalization refers to the growing unification or 
integration of financial markets all over the world, and this has resulted in high capital mobility 
and a large volume of gross international financial flows, particularly to the well-placed 
developing and transition economies. Rapid improvements in technologies for collecting, 
processing and disseminating information, along with the opening of domestic financial markets, 
the progressive and extensive liberalisation of controls on financial flows and markets, and 
increased private saving for retirement, have stimulated financial innovation and created a multi-
dollar pool of internationally mobile capital (Hausler, 2002; Eichengreen and Mussa, 1998; 
Guitan, 1999; Schneider, 2000, etc). Thus, both macroeconomic and technological factors have 
been driving financial globalization.  
International financial integration is predicated on open capital accounts of the balance of 
payments or capital account liberalisation (CAL). CAL entails lifting restrictions or controls on 
foreign capital inflows and outflows. To Stiglitz (2003), it has also meant eliminating the rules 
and regulations in many developing countries that could stem the flows of speculative and 
volatile hot money. Financial integration is expected to yield benefits in the spheres of 
efficiency, economic growth, risk diversification, inter-temporal consumption smoothing, 
technology transfer and spillover, etc. However, as Obadan (2005b) observes, until recently, the 
downside of free flow of foreign capital entailed in open capital accounts was never 
acknowledged or emphasized by the international financial institutions that vigorously promoted 
capital account liberalisation. There was no acknowledgement or stress of the fact that the 
advertised benefits of capital account liberalisation are dependent on certain pre-conditions and 
accompanying factors in the absence of which the elimination of controls on capital accounts 
  17may lead to macroeconomic instability and unstable financial markets or crisis. Indeed, in a 
significant number of countries, both domestic financial and external current account 
liberalisation have been associated with costly financial crises (Eichengreen and Mussa, 1998).  
International capital movements have tended to precipitate a crisis where capital flows 
out of a country suddenly. Many developing countries went through the process of financial 
liberalisation without taking precautionary measures or adhering to guidelines to minimize risks 
(Khor, 2001). And Bhagwati (2001) supports the view that capital account liberalisation had 
been pressed too hard, without adequate support mechanisms. Thus, the financial crises that hit 
some developing countries, especially East Asia and Latin America, in the 1990s, with resultant 
huge economic costs, point to the negative effects of volatile short-term capital flows and the 
grave risks and dangers that accompany careless financial liberalisation in developing countries. 
Even where there are no errors in international capital markets and the economic fundamentals 
are sound, financial globalization can bring crisis to a financially open economy due to the 
importance of external factors, such as the contagion effects of crises starting elsewhere (World 
Bank, 2002). The Sub-Saharan Africa, as Obadan (2005a) argues, has so far been spared the 
direct agony of financial crisis because of its underdeveloped financial markets. The sub-region 
thus has an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of other developing regions that undertook 
premature financial liberalisation, and then proceed with liberalisation in a measured way after 
careful preparation (Obadan, 2005a and 2005b)  
1.3  Drivers of Economic Globalization. 
Trade, investment and capital flows are the driving force of globalization. Accordingly, 
the extent of global economic integration can be gauged by developments in trade and financial 
flows. In this direction, Mussa (2000) has observed that despite occasional disruptions, such as 
the collapse of the Roman Empire or during the interwar period in the last century, the degree of 
economic integration among different societies around the world has generally been rising. And 
that during the past half a century, the pace of economic globalization (including the reversal of 
the interwar decline) has been particularly rapid. With the exception of human migration, global 
economic integration today is greater than it ever has been and it is likely to deepen going 
forward. What then have been the drivers of economic globalization? These drivers which have 
evolved over the different phases of globalization are well documented, for example, by The 
Economist Newspaper Ltd (1997), Mason (2001); World Bank, 2002; Mussa (2000), etc. The 
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continue to drive it in the future, are as follows: 
i.  Improvement in technology, especially of transport and communications. These have 
reduced the costs of transporting goods, services and factors of production, and of 
communicating economically useful knowledge and technology. Technological changes 
have rapidly dismantled barriers to international tradability of goods and services. 
Information technology has developed into the combination of computer and 
telecommunication technologies to transmit information, receive instructions and transact 
business which, in turn, has greatly enhanced efficiency, and made it easier and faster to 
complete international transactions. Besides, the revolution in transport and 
communication technology, and much improved availability of information have allowed 
individuals and firms to base their economic choices more on the quality of the economic 
environment in different countries (Quattara, 1997: 1). 
ii.  Tastes of individuals and societies. These have generally favoured taking advantage of 
the opportunities provided by declining costs and communication through increasing 
economic integration.  
iii.  Macroeconomic factors, especially policies relating to: 
•  deregulation and a widespread push toward liberalisation of trade and capital markets; 
•  outward-oriented reforms, especially in the context of structural adjustment 
programmes; 
•  international capital market imbalances of the 1980s and beyond; and 
•  the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1945, 
countries agreed to foreswear trade barriers.
3  As a result of both the GATT negotiations and 
unilateral decisions, many countries have lowered barriers to foreign trade and welcomed 
international capital flow as well. Both of these have heightened the pace of global economic 
integration. 
   
2.  GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS 
                                                 
3 Following the various rounds of trade negotiations, countries have cut their tariffs, with tariffs on manufactured 
goods down to about 4 per cent in the industrial countries  
  19Openness, domestic and global markets constitute the foundation of globalization. In this 
framework, the free market system and market prices are considered central. In situating the 
market, the IMF (2002) wrote as follows: 
“markets promote efficiency through competition and the division of labour – 
specialization that allows people and economies to focus on their best. Global markets 
offer greater opportunity for people to tap into more and larger markets around the world. 
It means that they have access to capital flows, technology, cheaper imports, and larger 
export markets”.  
But Buchanan, in Global Fortune (2000), (Robinson, 2001), apparently concerned about 
the level to which the market has been carried, argues that globalization is a myth which is 
rooted in the economic man. It elevates economics above all else, evolving worship for the 
market, which he further argues, “is a form of idolatry no less than worshipping the state. The 
market should be made to work for man, not the other way round”. Expressing a similar concern, 
the UNDP - Nigeria (1999) feels that in the current wave of globalization, the market has gone 
beyond just being one of the instruments to achieve economic and social objectives. To the 
organisation, the market “is currently being perceived as the only instrument. Nowadays, 
markets set the rules. It is this transcendence of markets, its all inclusive application beyond what 
had been previously defined as the limits of its jurisdiction that separates the contemporary 
version of the market from its predecessors”. And so, like Buchanan, the UNDP (1997) 
expresses the need to promote an alternative program which makes markets to work for people 
and not people for markets. The pertinent question, then is whether the market has answers to all 
economic problems. This is one of the issues that aspects of my works have focused upon. First, 
what is the free market system? 
2.1  The Free Market System 
The market system which has been one of two dominant paradigms for development, the 
other focusing on government and planning, is the framework that has been forcefully espoused 
by its promoters, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, since the late 1970s for the 
management of national economies. Since then, the market system has acquired heightened 
popularity in relation to development planning. According to Karl Levitt (1990): 
“The market magic paradigm has proven to be remarkably seductive because it combines 
the logical coherence of neoclassical economics with the structure of power in the real 
world. It is appealing because it appears to offer a personal and individual solution to 
economic pressure. This is a tragic illusion. In reality, it is an instrument whereby the rich 
and powerful impose on whole societies a set of values and ‘rules for the game’ which 
  20reinforce inequality and injustice and dismantle the capacity for social solidarity. 
Governments are disempowered and become unwilling debt collectors for international 
capital while millions of people are condemned to misery without end”. 
 
The market system whose prototype is laissez-faire capitalism has its intellectual roots in Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. In his book, The Wealth of Nations (Modern Library, 1776), Smith felt 
that the capitalist system operates as if everyone were guided by the unseen force – ‘invisible 
hand’. Everyone produces for his own benefit and for the benefit of the entire society at the same 
time.  
The central message of the free market system is that if economic activities are carried 
out only by private enterprises in competitive markets and the rights to productive resources and 
the pursuit of self interest in production and consumption are duly respected, the free market 
system will be an efficient system for resources allocation. A free and un-impeded mechanism of 
market forces, it is further argued, would engender Pareto-optimality in the allocation of 
resources. Thus, Stiglitz (1996), in a rather scornful note on the free market advocates, stated as 
follows: “markets lead to efficient outcomes. All that government needs to do to promote growth 
is get out of the way. The basic slogan is ‘get the prices right’. With the right prices, everyone 
will have an incentive to make the right resource allocations”. And so, the free market system is 
supposed to solve all economic problems of allocating scarce resources between alternative ends: 
rationing supplies of consumer goods in the commodity market, directing the allocation of 
production between commodities, allocating factors of production among various users; and 
helping to distribute income between factors of production and therefore between individuals 
(Johnson, 1962).  But the pertinent question is this: does the market solve all economic 
problems?  As I have argued forcefully in the past, the answer is no.  
2.2  Markets and the Solution of Economic Problems 
I have succinctly argued (Obadan, 1997 and 2003c) that even though markets may be 
important and market incentives can indeed be powerful, they are neither all-pervasive, nor do 
they have all the answers. In other words, the market is not a magic wand for resolving all 
economic problems. Therefore, if left unchecked, market forces can yield socially deleterious 
outcomes. In the real world, in the absence of the expected checks and balances (perfect 
competition, among others), the market system does not work perfectly. Indeed,  I, along with 
other authors (for example, Obadan and Ekuerarhe, 1986; Obadan, 1993; Obadan, 1997; Obadan, 
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into the limitations of free markets. First, is that even if the free market were to work perfectly, it 
may not be ideal as it ignores issues of income distribution as it concentrates on efficient flow of 
resources towards goods and services that consumers with means and ability to earn incomes will 
pay for. And in the context of globalization, UNDP (1999) has correctly noted that when the 
market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the opportunities and rewards 
(of globalization) spread unequally and inequitably – concentrating power and wealth in a select 
group of people, nations and corporations, marginalizing the others.  
Secondly, the free market system has often come under the hammer for its inequitable 
distribution of income and so may not be ideal for a developing country, or even a developed 
country, because the market system may foster efficiency but not equity. Thirdly, firms and 
consumers make their decisions on the basis of private benefits and costs and so they tend to 
ignore social costs and benefits. And as Loxley (1986) has observed, “market prices are suspect 
as guides to efficient resource allocation or optimal investment in a context in which social costs 
and benefits  deviate from private ones, which is likely to be the case when far-reaching changes 
are taking place in the economy”. Fourthly, the arguments for free markets ignore pertinent 
issues of monopolization and monopoly power as well as inadequate information. In most 
African markets, monopoly and oligopoly powers influence prices of products/factors of 
production and keep them out of line with production costs and long-run equilibrium. Under 
such circumstances, prices convey to consumers incorrect information about firms’ production 
costs. Thus, as Obadan (2003c; 1997) has stressed the holders of monopoly power act to promote 
their own interests at the expense of the interest of the society as a whole. And the inefficiency or 
absence of well-organised commodity, factor and capital markets have tended to reduce 
considerably, the ability of the developing countries’ economic systems to function effectively 
without external interference (Todaro, 1977).  
Stiglitz (1996) confirms the issue of widespread absence of markets in developing 
countries and the implication that prices cannot perform their coordination role. Thus, 
governments may have to assume a more active role in performing this function. The World 
Bank itself has acknowledged that financial markets and institutions, essential for mobilizing 
resources for development, are weak and underdeveloped in many developing countries (World 
Bank, 1995). In a similar vein, Shafaeddin (1994) has observed that “markets are either non-
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and labour markets fail to channel resources easily from one sector or industry to another; and 
producers have imperfect foresight; externalities exist in technology, learning and trade 
infrastructure and support services. Hence some government intervention is required to build up 
infant industrial capacity, whether or not for export, and to create markets or correct market 
failure”.  Similarly, as UNIDO (1970) has affirmed, “Governments cannot, and should not, take 
a merely passive role in the process of industrial expansion… for market forces, by themselves, 
cannot overcome the deep-seated structural rigidities in the economies of developing countries”. 
Finally, even under ideal conditions, markets only allow efficient allocation of resources in some 
circumstances. In a number of cases, market failure occurs, market systems of resource 
allocation are inefficient or unavailable, and non-market methods of allocating resources tend to 
be more efficient.  
 
 
2.3  African Markets and “Getting the Prices Right” 
African markets, like those of most other developing countries, do not provide a forum 
for the unfettered operation of market forces. In such markets, commodity and factor markets are 
not only rudimentary, fragmented and narrow, but also poorly organised. The existence of 
“distorted prices” means that producers and consumers lack the necessary information to act in a 
way conducive to efficient production and distribution. And while buyers are not able to get what 
they want at the best possible prices, sellers get rewards for inefficient production (Obadan, 
1997, 2003c). The incidence of market imperfections and market failure is still a prevalent 
phenomenon in African markets with the attendant distortions. These are reflected in collusive 
behaviour, lack of market information and associated uncertainties confronting producers and 
consumers; absence of perfect competition and presence of monopolistic practices; and the 
existence of substantial externalities. In Nigerian product markets, for example, the activities of 
myriads of exploitative middlemen and market associations in different products and trades 
prevent prices from having any relationship with production costs (Obadan, 1997). Prices, 
particularly of goods with inelastic demand, can be recklessly jacked up many times within a few 
days; these price hikes are initiated by producers, wholesalers and retailers. Because of numerous 
market imperfections, most prices in African markets are not only sticky downwards, they do not 
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However, I concede that the market imperfections do not completely erode the desirability of the 
interplay of market forces; rather their presence limits the extent of reliance on them and 
strengthens the case for some measure of government intervention. Therefore, in African 
countries where markets do not always work well, “getting the prices right” should not 
necessarily mean letting these prices to be determined by market forces. What is important is that 
where the government intervenes in markets, the key prices such as exchange rates, interest rates, 
and the prices of goods and services should be the correct ones in terms of reflecting opportunity 
cost. And regarding officially determined prices, “getting the prices right” does not necessarily 
mean the complete elimination of subsidies. All countries subsidise some goods and services to 
encourage their consumption (and tax some others which are considered luxuries) in the 
domestic or foreign markets.  The European Union, for example, subsidizes agriculture to the 
tune of US$1.0 billion a day. 
 
2.4  Implications of the Imperfect Market System.  
Considering the limitations of the free market system already outlined, coupled with the 
characteristics of African markets, it becomes obvious that the market system lacks the 
effectiveness to achieve the objectives of development in an underdeveloped economy. Where 
the market system is unable to produce and transmit sufficient information, as in our type of 
economies, and hence market participants are unable to undertake all the usually advantageous 
exchanges that would be entered into if buyers and sellers possessed the requisite information, 
the market does not produce a socially efficient allocation of resources (Levacic, 1987). Besides, 
unlike Adam Smith’s belief that in a capitalist system, people acting to further their own self-
interest will promote economic efficiency and the interests of the society as a whole, the holders 
of monopoly power act to promote their own interests at the expense of the society. The various 
inadequacies of the market in reality provide a basis for government intervention in free market 
economies. The invisible hand of the market must receive assistance from the visible hand of the 
government. The case for this has been copiously made in Obadan (1998c; 2003c). 
In the context of a mixed economy, the argument is not that government should replace 
the market, but rather that it should complement the market. The governments of the East Asian 
miracle economies recognized the limitations of markets and complemented and promoted them 
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4 The channels through which the governments of the High 
Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs)  intervened in their economies have been documented in, 
for example, (Obadan, 2004b); (Stiglitz, 1996); (The World Bank, 1993); (James, Naya and 
Meier, 1987). They are listed in box 2.1 and include subsides, low bank lending rates, protection 
of import substitutes, export marketing, creating markets, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2.1: Instruments of Government Intervention in East Asian Economies  
•  Targeted and subsidized credit to selected industries  
•  Low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings; 
•  Protection of import substitutes; 
•  Subsidies to declining industries that would not otherwise have thrived; 
•  Establishment and financial support of government banks; 
•  Public investment in applied research; 
•  Firm and industry specific targets; 
•  Development of export marketing institutions; 
•  Wide sharing of information between public and private sectors; 
•  Policies that actively sought to ensure macroeconomic stability; 
•  Making markets work more effectively by, for example, regulating financial markets; 
•  Creating markets where they did not exist;  
•  Helping to direct investment to ensure that resources were deployed in ways that would 
enhance economic growth and stability; etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, the free market dictum of minimal or no government intervention that is being 
preached today is violated by most of the above strategies of selective promotion. But they are 
the strategies that were closely associated with high rates of accumulation, wealth creation and 
poverty reduction, generally efficient allocation and, in the fast growing economies of East Asia, 
                                                 
4 The East Asian Economies that have been described as miracle economies because of their miraculous growths in 
the 1980s and 1990s are 8: Japan; the “Four Tigers,” viz: Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
(China); and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of South East Asia, namely: Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand. These countries have also been described as the Highly-performing Asian Economies (HPAEs). In a way, 
China’s remarkably high growth rates are not different from those of the HPAEs. Some of its policies resemble 
those of the HPAEs but its ownership structure and methods of corporate governance tended to differ (World Bank, 
1993).  
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correctly observe that: 
“the role of governments in the rapid industrial growth of the newly industrializing 
countries (NICs), with the possible exception of Hong Kong, seems to have been much 
greater than that allowed by neoclassical economics. … One criticism of neoclassical 
economics is that it plays make-believe in explaining the success of the Asian NICs by 
extolling their reliance on the market while neglecting the visible hand of the state 
industrial policies and active export promotion”.  
 
Singh (1995) similarly concludes that “between them Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China did all the things that a market-friendly approach to development is not 
supposed to do. Above all, the three countries followed an industrial strategy – a set of policies 
to deliberately change market prices and production priorities – which is explicitly ruled out by 
this (market) approach”. The lesson is that the poor countries must embrace the market strategy 
with caution and intervene to promote orderly, as opposed to chaotic, development that is in line 
with their vision (Obadan, 2004b). 
In the case of Nigeria, the desired intervention by the government, geared towards 
strengthening rather than supplementing the market system in the quest for accelerated 
development, must include proper planning of economic development. It was welcome news last 
October when the Federal Government announced at the Annual Conference of the Nigerian 
Economic Society (NES) in Abuja that the country was to return to formal development 
planning.
5 This is against the background of the fact that for eight years in office, the Obasanjo 
government jettisoned planning in favour of unbridled market system which tended to compound 
the nation’s structural problems. That government was apparently misled by the growing 
skepticism about the relevance of institutionalized economic planning under conditions of 
economic liberalisation and private sector-led development following the resurgence of 
neoliberalism and market fundamentalism actively canvassed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
But in my book, National Development Planning and Budgeting in Nigeria, Obadan (2003c) and 
another paper(Obadan, 2001c), I had argued forcefully that in the real world market economy, 
economic planning, requiring an orderly and systematic management of the economy, is not 
inconsistent with the free market orientation of the economy. Planning is required to redress 
                                                 
5 The Nigerian Economic society has actually endorsed the proposed return to development planning. Some 
economists, e.g., Diejomaoh (2008) and Aregbeyen (2008), among others, have also spoken in favour of planning.  
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achieve other objectives such as economic restructuring, industrialization, high level of 
employment and macroeconomic stability. Under economic liberalisation conditions, planning is 
relevant as development cannot be left in the hands of market forces alone. Planning may then 
take the form of indicative planning in the context of long-term planning or sectoral planning, for 
example, of the energy sector. Even John Williamson, the economist, who coined the term 
“Washington Consensus” (the package of neoliberal economic policies) in 1989, had to concede 
ten years later that neo-liberalism cannot provide an effective agenda for reducing poverty.
6 He 
stated, inter alia (Williamson, 2000): 
 
“the popular, or populist interpretation of the Washington Consensus, meaning market 
fundamentalism or neo-liberalism, refers to laissez faire Reganomics – let’s bash the 
state, the markets will resolve everything. I would not subscribe to the view that such 
views offer an effective agenda for reducing poverty. We know that poverty reduction 
demands efforts to build the human capital of the poor, but the populist interpretation 
fails to address that issue”. 
 
Ajakaiye (2001) correctly highlights three principal aspects of planning in a mixed 
economy which can successfully move the economy from a current undesirable state towards a 
more desirable state on a sustainable basis.  
(i)  Deliberate utilisation of public sector resources to execute social overhead capital 
projects in areas necessary to create enabling environment for all economic agents to 
operate optimally. Government investments in economic infrastructure are intended to 
maximize output, employment and income while investments in the provision of social 
infrastructure are intended to create enabling environment for the households to 
maximize their utility and improve the quality of labour services, and hence their 
earnings from labour services supplied to the private and public sectors of the economy.  
(ii)  Participation in directly productive activities at least to get things started while taking 
steps to actively seek private sector participation and eventual takeover of such activities 
                                                 
6 The term “Washington Consensus” was used by John Williamson in 1989 to describe a set of market-oriented 
reforms that he thought the economies of Latin America needed at the time. It was a 10-point policy reforms 
package which Williamson thought everyone in Washington agreed with, hence the term “Washington Consensus”. 
But the policy package soon became a model for the wider developing world. It emphasized fiscal discipline, market 
economy, openness and trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, tax reform and reordering public 
expenditure priorities, property rights, among others (see IMF, “Redrafting the Reform Agenda”, Finance and 
Development,  4013), September, 2003. 
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productive activities are aimed at shifting the frontiers of development opportunities by 
getting things started in such areas while taking steps to encourage private sector to take 
over later (Also see Obadan, 1998b and 2003c) 
(iii)  Designing appropriate policy packages to facilitate, stimulate, and direct private 
economic activities in order to promote a harmonious relationship between the desires of 
private businessmen and households and the economic plans of the government. In 
recognition of the fact that the unfettered operation of the market mechanism can cause 
highly unstable situation, reflected in severe fluctuations in income and employment, 
over the course of business cycles, government makes conscious efforts to create 
conditions that will prevent economic instability while at the same time stimulating 
growth.  
 
 
2.5  Government’s Inevitable Role  
Thus, as Obadan (2003c, 2001c, 1998b) has stressed, the government has a duty to 
intervene in economic activities, failing which the “market” may lead to a misallocation of 
present and future resources, or to other consequences that may not be in the long run interest of 
society (Todaro, 1977). Very importantly, government cannot, and should not, assume a mere 
passive role in the process of development, for market forces, by themselves, cannot overcome 
the deep seated structural rigidities in the economies of developing countries. And today, against 
the background of a mixed economy, the strategy of development should be midway between 
laissez-faire capitalism and socialism. In order to avoid problems, it is desirable to have the right 
balance by not moving too far on either side. This implies recognizing the appropriate roles of 
the market and the government against the background of reality.  
In Obadan (1998b) is a summary of indispensable areas of government intervention, even 
in a deregulated economy. They relate to:  
i.  planning  and organising development in a disciplined and coherent manner; 
ii.  tackling head-on issues of economic growth and development as well as income 
distribution; 
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meaningless, if not impossible, and which, by  their nature cannot be left to private 
enterprises: e.g. some basic socio-economic infrastructure and services which include 
national defence, maintenance of law and order, and the administration of justice, which 
are also necessary to support private sector investment; 
iv.  providing policy intervention to achieve macroeconomic stability and allow for steady 
economic growth. Indeed, unfettered operation of the market mechanism can engender 
highly unstable situation reflected in severe fluctuations in income and employment over 
the course of business cycles;  
v.  avoiding the experience of unguarded application of the market mechanism which only 
succeeds in creating far-reaching distortions, exacerbating the problems of income 
distribution and heightening social tension without achieving any growth and 
development; 
vi.  making markets work through appropriate rules and regulations, and undertaking 
corrective interventions where there are market failures; 
vii.  providing the institutions and supportive framework to create and enforce the rules, 
establish law and order, and ensure property rights; 
viii.  providing investment in the social sector, particularly education, health, human resources, 
social welfare and essential services which are targeted towards the poor and vulnerable; 
ix.  putting in place an efficient machinery to mobilize resources for development, 
particularly tax revenue; 
x.  investing in crucial directly productive activities that the private sector is usually 
unwilling to go into at the initial stage. Such activities could later be privatized on 
economic basis;  
xi.  keeping markets competitive and warning consumers about commodities that may be 
hazardous to their health; 
xii.  establishing a stable monetary system, standards of weights and measures, and setting 
and enforcing a body of commercial laws to provide confidence in contracts which 
govern relationships among private buyers and sellers; 
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and employing research and development activities to boost output of the various sectors 
of the economy; 
xiv.  producing goods and services which by their nature must be provided by only one seller, 
e.g. output of natural monopolies and/or desirable goods and services that the private 
sector is reluctant to produce because of low profit prospects.  
 
The above, among other reasons, make government intervention very compelling. But 
such intervention would, however, need to be properly implemented to forestall government 
failures and ensure the desired results.   
 
2.6   The International Environment/Markets 
Over the years, the developing economies, which for a long time, depended heavily on 
primary commodities for their economic growth prospects, have operated within a hostile 
international environment. In the course of their engagement with the globalization process, 
developing countries are greatly exposed to external shocks. Such shocks include fluctuations in 
commodity prices, terms of trade, volume of trade, external finance, interest rates, and increased 
protectionism. These shocks are known to be highly correlated with the gross domestic product 
and account for a significant share of the volatility in developing countries. From my analysis( 
Obadan, 1996a and 1996b) and (Obadan and Obioma, 1999), is the submission that the volatility 
of developing economies to global economic disturbances not only retards their development 
efforts but also limits the countries’ abilities to take independent decisions or adopt the most 
desirable development strategies. Consequently, developing countries have become increasingly 
concerned about numerous trade and financial issues which cause distortions in the global 
market. One of these is the protectionist practices of the industrialized countries. From the 
teachings of neoclassical economics, the blessings of free trade and international specialization 
are well known: maximization of world output of goods and services, and consumption, and 
hence welfare. Thus, neoclassical economists contend that perceived barriers to the faster 
evolution of international flows of goods, services and capital be reduced/eliminated within the 
international context as well as the nation-state level (UN, Economic and Social Council, 2000). 
And the GATT and its successor, WTO, have been at the centre of free international trade 
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forcefully advocate for free trade.  
But overtime, there has been some ambivalence on the part of the leading industrial 
countries in their practice of free trade. Indeed, many developing countries take the demand to 
open their markets as a clear manifestation of Northern double standards, since the latter have 
consistently failed to open their own economies (UN, Ibid). And as Obadan (2007d) has 
observed, when it suited their interests, the developed nations have advocated and espoused free 
trade with a lot of vehemence. At other times, they practiced protectionism using instruments 
such as tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, discriminatory tariff treatment and a host of non-
tariff barriers. The nature, scope and intensity of the protectionist practices are well documented, 
for example, in Anjara, et al (1985), Stern (2002) and UNDP (1999).  
Anjara, et al, for example, had observed that despite the continued tariff cuts and limited 
instances of liberalisation of non-tariff barriers, most industrial countries became more protective 
than before. According to them, trade restrictions or trade distorting measures were not only 
intensified or imposed on traditionally protected sectors such as steel, textiles and clothing, and 
agriculture, but were also extended to such sectors as electronics and automobiles. And Stern 
(2002) has pointed to the hypocritical nature of the rich countries in encouraging poor countries 
to liberalize trade and to tackle the associated problems of adjustment while at the same time 
succumbing to power groups in their own countries that seek to perpetuate protection for their 
narrow self-interest. According to him, even after the Uruguay Round of trade liberalisation, 
“OECD countries still maintain significant barriers to trade from developing countries. Average 
tariffs in the United States, Canada and the European Union, and Japan range from only 4.3% in 
Japan to 8.3% in Canada, but their tariffs and trade barriers are much higher on products 
exported by the developing countries, particularly major agricultural staple food products; 
textiles, clothing and footwear” and other products in which the developing countries have a 
comparative advantage.  
Thus, as the developing countries strive to open their economies and expand exports, they 
find themselves confronting significant trade barriers – leaving them in effect with neither aid 
nor trade (Stiglitz, 1999). And as Obadan (1999b) had summed up, even where the developing 
countries did not suffer from shocks relating to terms of trade, commodity price declines or 
reduced demand for primary product exports, the protectionist measures of the industrialized 
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Besides tariffs, subsidies to domestic farmers in high-income economies have created formidable 
barriers for developing countries trying to reach global markets for agricultural products. Koeler 
(2001), former Managing Director of the IMF, deplored the situation whereby OECD countries 
spend US$360 billion a year on agricultural subsidies while poverty rages in developing 
countries, especially in farming and rural regions. He considered the phenomenon political and 
economic madness.  
Developing countries’ problems in the global market do not derive just from 
protectionism but also from fluctuating commodity prices and declining terms of trade. Many 
developing countries still depend heavily on primary commodities for the bulk of their export 
receipts. But there has been the problem of weak market for primary commodities, reflected in 
secular declines in the prices of non-oil commodity exports, in particular, in the world market 
coupled with excess supplies of the commodities. Energy prices were also volatile. For example, 
crude oil prices rose by 74 per cent from early 1994 through the end of 1996, then fell by 56 per 
cent by the end of 1998. It, however, recovered nearly the entire decline of the previous two 
years in 1999. Since then, prices have maintained an upward trend, hitting over US$135.0 per 
barrel in May, 2008. On the other hand, average non-oil commodity prices rose by 46 per cent in 
mid 1993 to mid 1997, and then dropped by 30 per cent by late 1999. Table 2.1 and Fig. 1 show 
the longer-term trends of various commodity prices from 1970 to 2006. The prices of non-energy 
commodities declined persistently from 1980 to 2001; agricultural commodities from 1980 to 
2000; and petroleum from 1980 to 1995. 
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Perhaps, in light of this phenomenon, the UNDP Global Human Development Report, 
1999, observed that many developing countries were benefiting little from expanding global 
markets and were becoming even more marginal inspite of their relatively high trade openness 
and further that they hang on the global markets with the prices of primary commodities having 
fallen to their lowest level in a century and a half. Generally, the prices of commodities have 
been more volatile than the prices of manufactures, and both prices of oil and non-oil 
commodities (as at 1999) had fallen relative to the prices of manufactures (Obadan and Obioma, 
1999). The implications of fluctuations in commodity prices are often far-reaching, and include 
inducement of short – to medium-term changes in poverty, especially during busts. 
Available statistics of terms of trade trends for African countries show that from 1980 – 
98, except in very negligible cases, the terms of trade indexes and the average annual growths 
substantially declined. The continuing decline in the terms of trade for developing countries’ 
commodity exports vis-à-vis their imports of manufactures has become more acute in recent 
years. It has been responsible for the transfer of huge volumes of real resources from commodity 
exporting developing countries through the mechanism of income losses arising from terms of 
trade changes. Khor (2000) provides some data on this. 
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What is clear from the experiences of the developing countries that depend on volatile 
commodity exports is that such dependence impose significant costs on their economies. They 
have continued to be marginalized in the globalization process, as the global markets provide an 
unlevel playing field. The potential for massive changes in relative prices, real incomes and the 
level of economic activity can increase uncertainty and have a negative impact on performance 
and poverty. A very important challenge thus derives from the effects of commodity booms and 
busts, the effective management of which requires appropriate policies. Furthermore, 
diversification of economic structures in favour of less reliance on commodity exports is a tested 
avenue for ensuring stability. 
 Table 2.1:   Primary Commodity Prices (1990 = 100) 
  1970  1980 1990 1995 2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007 
World  Bank  Commodity  Price  Index  (1990  =  100)                  
Non-energy  Commodities  156  159 100 104 89 84 89  91  100 114  138  158 
Agriculture  163  175 100 112 90 84 93  95  98  106  115  131 
Beverages  203  230 100 129 91 76 91  87  88  109  11  125 
Food  166  177 100 100 87 91 97  96  103 103  109  131 
Raw  materials  130  133 100 116 93 81 89  98  99  107  124  134 
Fertilizers  108  164 100 88  109  105  108 106 118 126  130  204 
Metals  and  minerals  144  120  100  87 85  80  78 82 105  133  195  220 
Petroleum  19  204 100 64  127  113  117 126 154 218  254  279 
Steel  products  111  100  100  91 79  71  73 79 114  129  122  121 
MUV  G-S  Index  28  79  100 117 97 94 93  100 107 107  110  111 
 
Source: Global Development Indicators,  2007, 2008. 
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Trade liberalisation is the major instrument geared towards the goal of global economic 
integration. It has been at the heart of WTO negotiations and agreements, and entails the removal 
of import quotas and other quantitative restrictions, abolition or reduction of the level and 
dispersion of import tariff rates, removal of export taxes, removal of protection for local 
industries and export subsidies, elimination of non-tariff barriers, and devaluation of the local 
currency (Obadan and Obioma, 1999; Shaffaedin, 1994; NACCIMA, 2002).  
There has been an extensive debate on the economic rationale for trade liberalisation 
(UNCTAD, 1993 and 1997). The rationale is commonly based on the view that liberalisation 
would lead to more efficient use and allocation of resources through, inter alia, the exposure of 
the domestic economy to world market disciplines and better access to state-of-the-art 
technologies (Obadan, 2005c). And to Ajayi (2001) “the appeal of a more open economy is 
based on simple but powerful premise: economic integration will improve economic 
performance. Additionally, globalization will offer new opportunities such as expanded markets 
and the acquisition of new technology and ideas – all of which can yield not only increased 
production but also higher standards of living. However, Khor (2001) has observed that “the 
conventional view that trade liberalisation is necessary and has automatic and generally positive 
effects for development is being challenged empirically and analytically. Rodrik and Rodriguez 
(1999) have done exactly this and expressed skepticism on the studies that have found a positive 
relationship between trade liberalisation and economic growth, on methodological grounds. The 
implication of both studies is the need to formulate appropriate approaches towards trade policy 
in developing countries.    
3.1  The Experience of the Developing Countries 
The above observation notwithstanding, the developing countries have since the mid-
1980s, undertaken widespread and rapid (rather ‘big-bang’) trade liberalisation, essentially not in 
the context of multilateral trade negotiations, but rather in response to the conditionalities 
attached to the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes that they were cajoled (is it 
coerced?) to implement by the Bretton Woods Institutions. The promise of economic success 
through adjustment, together with the marginalization of the least developed countries in the 
context of global private capital flows and their dependence on debt relief and aid, explains why 
the Least Development Countries (LDCs) have gone further than other developing countries in 
  36trade liberalization. Indeed, as UNCTAD Report (2004:179) has shown, using the IMF’s index 
of trade restrictiveness, the least developed countries sub-group (which has over 30 African 
countries) have undertaken greater trade liberalisation than other developing countries; much 
deeper trade liberalization than the large industrializing Asian and Latin American economies. 
The UNCTAD report went further to indicate that the average index for LDCs as a group was 4, 
which the IMF regards as “open”, and it is exactly the same average for the European Union, 
Japan and the United States. And among the LDCs, there is deeper trade liberalisation in the 
African LDCs than in the Asian LDCs, and also in commodity-exporting LDCs than in the 
manufactures and/or services exporting LDCs. A few countries in East Asia followed a selective 
and gradual approach to trade liberalisation, tailoring the process of integration to the level of 
economic development and the capacity of existing institutions and industries. Thus, although 
Asian LDCs and those exporting manufactures and services have undertaken trade liberalisation, 
the African LDCs and commodity exporters have undertaken deeper trade liberalisation. And 
using the Sachs-Warner index of openness, all the LDCs are now ‘open’. 
But what has been the experience of the developing countries and African countries in 
particular? Some empirical evidence, though challenged on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, has been produced to show that countries with more open trade regimes grew faster 
than those that were more inward-oriented (see, for example, Dollar and Kraay, 2001a and 
2001c). But the experience of many developing countries with successful export performance 
shows that a high degree of import liberalisation is neither necessary nor sufficient for export 
expansion (UNCTAD, 1989). The immediate effect of import liberalisation has been to widen 
balance of payments deficits, often accompanied by a change in the composition of imports in 
favour of consumer goods, particularly luxuries. One major problem faced by the developing 
countries in the liberalisation process is that they may be able to control how fast to liberalize 
their imports and hence increase the goods imported, but cannot determine by themselves how 
fast their exports grow (Khor, 2000). This is because many important factors, besides 
liberalisation, determine export performance. They include the price of the existing exported 
products, market access and infrastructure, and human and enterprise capacity required for new 
exports. Developing countries have a major problem accessing the markets of the developed 
countries. As was noted before, many tariff and non-tariff barriers in the developed countries 
have continued to hinder exports from the developing countries.  
  37The liberalisation process in many developing countries occurred without any prior 
preparations to ensure that domestic industries were ready to face exposure to international 
competition. A sudden roll back of trade protection, together with devaluations, demand restraint 
and removal of subsidies, and hikes in interest rates tended to lower capacity utilisation in 
industry and gradually erode the industrial base. Thus, many poor countries have found that trade 
liberalisation has produced negative results for their economies or has marginalized them. While 
the import propensity of most developing countries increased sharply as a result of liberalisation, 
exports failed to keep pace. Indeed, a study on the effect of trade liberalisation on the economic 
growth and exports in the least developed countries by Shafaeddin, (1994) found “no clear and 
systematic association since the early 1980s between trade liberalisation and devaluation, on the 
one hand, and the growth and diversification of exports of LDCs on the other. In fact, trade 
liberalisation has been accompanied by de-industrialization in many LDCs and where export 
expanded it was not always accompanied by the expansion of export capacity”. In similar veins, 
Stein (1992); Mkandawire (1998 and 2005); Nwaba (1999); Adenikinju and Chete (1996); and 
UNCTAD (2004) have also stressed the phenomenon of de-industrialization occasioned by SAP 
policies in Africa.   
Even John Williamson (2003), of the “Washington Consensus” fame concedes that in 
some cases one can criticize the way liberalisation reforms were implemented. For example, 
trade liberalisation focused exclusively on import liberalisation, without sufficient attention to 
improving export market access and establishing a competitive exchange rate to ensure that the 
resources freed up in the import-competing sectors would flow into the export sector. Also, 
financial liberalisation often occurred without the appropriate complement of prudential 
supervision that a liberalized financial system demands. Besides, privatized enterprises too often 
did not sell into a competitive market, nor were they properly regulated. Thus, trade 
liberalisation failed in many developing countries and Shaffaedin (1994) profers reasons for such 
failure considering that it was undertaken under external pressure. They relate to how reforms 
were perceived, their context and timing and the particular circumstances of individual countries. 
In almost all cases, trade policy reform influenced by the orthodox approach has been regarded 
as synonymous with ‘uniform’ import liberalisation, applicable ‘universally’  to all developing 
countries; the level of development, industrial base and special structural characteristics of 
individual countries were disregarded. Moreover, such an approach to liberalisation is based on a 
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involves unrealistic assumptions such as perfect functioning of markets in all countries, no 
externalities and no other causes of market failure, and constant returns to scale.  
In the light of the foregoing, one important observation made by the UNCTAD (1999) 
(See Trade and Development Report, 1999), and which I share, is pertinent. If trade liberalisation 
is carried out in an inappropriate manner in countries that are not ready or able to cope or which 
face conditions that are unfavourable, it can contribute to a vicious cycle of trade and balance of 
payments deficits, financial instability, debt and recession. Therefore, from my perspective, 
developing countries need to participate in the world economy on their own terms, not the terms 
“dictated” by global markets and multilateral institutions. Furthermore, as trade liberalisation can 
(and often does) make imports to increase without a corresponding increase in exports, it should 
not be pursued automatically and rapidly as an end in itself, or in a “big bang” manner. Rather, 
important factors must be taken cognizance of, among which are timing, quality, sequencing and 
scope of liberalisation (especially of imports). In addition, other conditions for success must be 
in place, e.g., strengthening of local industries and enterprise, human resource and technological 
development, infrastructure development, export capacity and markets. And so, the pace of 
liberalisation has to be predicated on these pre-conditions in order to avoid negative results.  
3.2  Nigeria’s Experience with Trade Liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation was one of the hallmarks of the structural adjustment programme 
(SAP) in Nigeria, and it entailed import liberalisation, market determination of exchange rates, 
free marketing of export commodities, etc. The implementation of the policy acquired greater 
significance in the 1990s with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral 
Negotiations and the emergence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In Nigeria, the data 
provided by the Central Bank of Nigeria shows that major current and capital account 
transactions in the economy have been substantially liberalized (Table 3.1) although minor 
administrative restrictions may be noticed in a few transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
  39Table 3.1:  Nigeria’s Status on Current and Capital Account Liberalisation  
   STATUS REMARKS 
 CURRENT 
ACCOUNT 
TRANSACTIONS  
  
1  Goods (Trade) Account   Partially 
Liberalized  
Liberalized except for few items on the 
negative list 
2  Services  Liberalized Documentation removed, effective 2006. 
3  Income  Liberalized   Documentation removed, effective 2006. 
4  Current transfers  Liberalized Documentation removed effective 2006. 
foreigners granted 100% remittance of 
earned income. 
 CAPITAL  AND 
FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNT 
TRANSACTIONS 
  
5  Capital transfers  Liberalized  
6  Direct investment   Liberalized Investors  guaranteed unfettered access to 
funds. 
7  Potfolio investment  Partially 
liberalized 
Investment in money market securities must 
be for a maturity period of at least one year. 
Investors guaranteed unfettered access to 
funds 
8  Other investment  Liberalized Non-residents  free to extend loan, but 
without government guarantee 
Source:  Central Bank of Nigeria. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, for the year 
ended 31
st December, 2006. 
The Table shows that the current account is near full liberalisation. It is only the goods 
(trade) account that is partially liberalized because of a few items on the negative list. In the 
capital account all the items are liberalized except portfolio investment which is partially 
liberalized. In Nigeria, as Obadan (2000) and Obadan, Jerome and Agba (2001) have observed, 
the apparently wholesale adoption of the liberalisation policies and WTO rules at the present 
stage of the country’s development has tended to pose a serious threat to the industrialization 
process in the country. According to the Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria (MAN) (n.d): 
The full-throttle liberalisation of trade has given rise to massive inflows of all 
manner of finished products from industrialized countries of the West and Asia, 
including second-hand and used products (textile, footwear, automobiles and 
motor cycles, fridges and air-conditioners); substandard and fake products (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and toiletries, electrical materials, and foods). The 
situation is not helped by rampant dumping, smuggling and under-invoicing 
through which the various products are brought into the country and necessary 
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market include electrical appliances, candles, matches, R20 batteries, drinks and 
electronics.  
 
This free inflow of imports has tended to hinder the growth of local industries in no small 
measure. Essentially, the trade liberalisation policy has been characterized by a number of 
glaring weaknesses, as analyzed in Obadan (2000, 2001e). One of these is the neglect of the need 
to enhance productivity and another is the overemphasis on currency devaluation without taking 
due cognizance of the adverse effects on production and productivity. Furthermore, the 
“uniformity” of trade liberalisation has worked against exports of manufactures while its 
“universality” adversely affected export earnings from primary commodities. Manufactured 
exports were handicapped as existing and potential export industries were deprived of scarce 
imported inputs while imports of other goods, including all kinds of luxury items, tended to 
flourish. Also, the impact of devaluation on production costs in manufacturing has been very 
high because of its high import intensity.  Thus, the orthodox features of trade liberalisation have 
neglected the importance of long-run development of supply capacity and the limitation of 
market forces in building up such capacity (Shafaedin, 1994:2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1: Trade Liberalization and De-Industrialization in Nigeria 
The liberalisation policy has had a devastating effect on local production and employment, and 
discouraged further investment in Nigeria. Indeed, trade liberalisation has been accompanied by 
deindustrialization in Nigeria like in many other developing countries. Both the MAN and the 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) have drawn attention to a number of industries and firms that 
have gone under as a result of unfettered trade liberalisation. In the Guardian Newspaper of April, 
27, 2008, the Group Managing Director of Chanrai Group spoke of how the importation of 
finished textile products led to the closure of his textile company, Afprint, which started 
operations in 1966 in Nigeria. Over 3,000 workers were thrown into the labour market.  
 
Source: Obadan, 2008. 
 
 
 
As I have argued in the past (Obadan, 2000), one fact that policy makers have failed to 
recognize is that most developing countries (Nigeria included) are not currently adequately 
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high level of international competitiveness demanded is hampered by numerous capacity 
constraints at the policy, institutional and enterprises levels. In Nigeria’s case, a conducive and 
enabling environment had been lacking while the infrastructure support constraint is very 
binding. In many cases, enterprises have had to provide their own electricity and 
telecommunications facilities, sink their boreholes, and even construct/maintain their roads (a 
phenomenon the private sector euphemistically refers to as b.y.o.i (build your own 
infrastructure), all at prohibitive costs and with adverse implications for competitiveness. It is 
thus hardly surprising in Nigeria’s case that, in light of the country’s import-dependent 
production structure, unfettered trade liberalisation has tended to ruin domestic industries and 
destroy supply capacity as a result of prohibitive imported input costs, while imported finished 
goods continue to flourish at the expense of local substitutes.  
Therefore, as I have argued in the past, trade liberalisation has to be done sensibly and in 
an orderly manner in the context of guided liberalisation. To this end, it is important for the 
country to take maximum advantage of any provisions for autonomy and flexibility within the 
WTO rules (Obadan, Jerome and Agba, 2001: 182). Also, Nigeria should be able to decide on 
the rate and scope of liberalisation and combine this appropriately with the strategic protection of 
local industries and enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  42Box 4.1:  Opportunities and Challenges of Globalization 
With the increasing breakdown of trading barriers under globalization and the increasing 
integration of the world market, industrial firms, particularly in the advanced industrial countries 
are faced with both the opportunities and challenges of operating in a truly global market. The 
opportunities are no doubt many: global markets; exposure to new ideas, technology and products; 
economies of scale in production; gains in efficiency in the utilisation of productive resources; 
greater specialization between nations; better quality products and wide option for consumers; 
increased competitiveness and increased output; and ability to tap cheaper sources of finance 
internationally. These opportunities notwithstanding, globalization has tended to wear two faces. 
Some view it as a beneficial process, an unmixed blessing, with potential to boost productivity and 
living standards everywhere. On the other hand, others believe that it increases inequality within 
and between countries, threatens employment and living standards, and thwarts social progress. 
The World Development Indicators, (2007) seems to confirm this dual perception when it 
acknowledged that:  
“Globalization has created opportunities and challenges for developing countries. While the 
experiences of China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and some other countries have 
demonstrated that integration into the global economy is necessary for long-term growth 
and poverty reduction, concerns have been expressed over equality of opportunity and the 
unequal distribution of benefits. Many poor countries and poor people in many countries 
have not been able to take full advantage of the opportunities brought by globalization or to 
participate in its benefits”. 
This situation is so, perhaps, because as Obadan (2004c) has argued, most developing countries, 
especially the poorer ones, have very weak capacities to take advantage of a global market. In the 
case of Africa, Fischer (1999) points to the argument that the continent did not have the capacity to 
enter the global village as it is still grappling to set up basic necessities such as good roads, 
railways and transport.  
Removing the obstacles to full participation by poor countries and poor people is essential 
to making globalization inclusive. However, as Obadan (2004a) has stressed, African countries 
need to embrace globalization in the full awareness of not only the opportunities but also the risks. 
These risks include those of financial crises, difficulties of monetary policy management as a result 
of capital account liberalisation and global capital flows, inequalities in world trade, increasing 
poverty for many people and increasing polarization between the rich and the poor – both within 
and between countries.  
 
Source: Obadan (2003a, 2003b, 2004c). 
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4.  GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
4.1  Global Economic Integration  
As trade, investment and capital flows are the driving force of globalization, the extent of 
global economic integration can be gauged by developments in such flows. In this respect, trade 
has been growing in importance in the world economy. Increasingly a large share of world 
output is generated in activities linked directly or indirectly to international trade. The volume of 
world trade in goods and services (exports plus imports) rose from barely one-tenth (10%) of 
world GDP in 1950 to about one-third (33%) in 2000 (Mussa, 2000: 10). It stood at more than 
one-half (58%) in 2005 and 61.2 per cent in 2006 (Fig. 2). In the last two and a half decades, the 
pace of global economic integration has continued to accelerate, such that exports and imports of 
goods and services exceeded $26 trillion in 2005, or 58 per cent of total global output, up from 
44 per cent in 1980. Also between 1986 and 1996, the ratio of world trade to GDP increased by 
40.6 per cent and between 1990 and 2005, it increased by 46 per cent.  
 
 
 
Although most of the world trade takes place among the developed countries within the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), developing countries, particularly the 
newly industrializing ones, are increasingly becoming significant players both as exporters and 
  44as potential markets for the developed countries. Countries in East Asia and the Pacific have 
experienced higher export growth than most others. And in their study of 24 ‘post – 1980 
developing country globalizers’, Dollar and Kraay (2001) report that as a group, their share of 
GDP doubled to 33 per cent. In contrast, trade relative to GDP declined for ‘non-globalizers’.
7 
They further found a statistically significant and economically meaningful effect of trade on 
growth – an increase in trade as a share of GDP of 20 percentage points increase growth by 
between 0.5 and 1 percentage point a year. As was noted before, these results have, however, 
been questioned on methodological grounds (see Rodrik and Rodriguez, 2000). 
There has also been a phenomenal growth in cross-border financial flows especially in 
the form of equity and portfolio investment flows, compared with the past. Gross private capital 
flows across national borders exceeded 32 percent of global output in 2005, up from 9 per cent in 
1980 (Fig. 3). During the period, 1980 – 2005, the ratio of world gross capital flows to GDP 
increased significantly by 214.6 per cent. While the ratio for the high income countries shot up 
by 238.2 per cent, those of low income countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased by 
179.2 and 178.4 per cent, respectively. Thus, on a global level, there has been an increase in the 
degree of global economic integration through trade in goods and services during the past half a 
century.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The developing countries that have been called ‘new globalizers’ include; China, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, Mauritius, Poland, Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan (China) Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Venezuela.  
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4.2  Africa’s Integration with the World Economy  
The developing countries as a whole have become more integrated with the world 
economy, but Africa and the SSA have not kept pace with the whole. In other words, Africa is 
least integrated with the world economy (See, for example, Obadan, 2001b; 2004a; Obadan and 
Obioma, 1999; Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2003). While developing countries as a whole have 
increased their share of world trade from 17.2 per cent in 1990 to 28.1 per cent in 2005, Africa as 
a whole performed poorly with its share of world trade being less than 2.0 per cent. In their 
analysis, Dupasquier and Osakwe (2003) sum up the situation as follows: “over the past five 
decades, Africa’s participation in the world economy has declined. The region’s share of world 
exports fell from 4.6% in 1980 to 1.8% in 2000. Its share of world imports declined from 3.6% to 
1.6% over the same period. Furthermore, Africa’s share of global inward FDI flows fell from 
1.8% in the period 1986 – 90 to 0.8% over the period 1999 – 2000. These figures are well below 
the developing countries average of 17.5% and 17.9% over the same period”.   
Specifically, the share of SSA’s trade in global trade fell from some 3 per cent in 1960 to 
1.2 per cent in 1990. It rose slightly to 1.7 per cent in 2005. (Table 2.1 and Fig. 4)). Besides, 
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earnings per person between 1980 and 1996 (Sachs and Sievers, 1999:13). This is inspite of the 
fact that since the mid-1980s, most African countries have made significant progress in 
liberalizing their exchange and trade regimes, invariably in the context of World Bank-IMF-
supported adjustment programmes or regional arrangements. Furthermore, their economies are 
relatively open (shown by ratios of exports to GDP) compared to the advanced economies or 
those of developing countries as a whole (see Table 4.1). Obviously, SSA economies as a group 
appear to be more open than those of the high income economies. Furthermore, Obadan (2001b 
and 2004a), in his analysis of the trade ratios for individual SSA countries, shows that out of the 
38 countries covered, the ratios fell in 11 countries between 1986 and 1996, and were quite low 
in others. In contrast, the available statistics show that the ratios of trade to GDP in Asia and 
Latin American countries recorded positive increases and, indeed, very significant increases in 
Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
 
 
 
 
  47Table 4.1:  Sub-Saharan Africa and the World: Global Integration Indicators.  
A) Exports/GDP Ratio (%) 
World  
Low Income Countries  
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
 
B) Imports/GDP Ratio (%) 
World 
Low Income Countries 
SSA 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
C) Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment / GDP %) 
World 
Low Income Countries 
SSA 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
D) Gross Capital Flows/GDP Ratio (%) 
World 
Low Income Countries 
SSA 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
 
E) Share in World Trade (%) 
SSA 
Low Income Countries 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
 
F) Share of Manufacturing in Total Exports (%) 
World 
SSA 
1990 2005 
 
15.9 
11.2 
22.6 
16.1 
13.0 
23.3 
15.8 
 
23.4 
18.4 
30.5 
30.7 
23.0 
38.9 
21.2 
 
16.3 
13.1 
19.0 
15.4 
10.9 
24.0 
16.4 
 
23.9 
22.3 
27.0 
28.7 
21.2 
34.9 
22.5 
 
1.0 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
0.8 
1.6 
1.0 
 
2.2 
1.5 
2.7 
2.9 
2.9 
3.2 
2.1 
 
10.3 
2.4 
5.1 
5.9 
7.9 
5.0 
11.0 
 
32.4 
6.7 
14.2 
13.1 
9.8 
11.4 
37.2 
 
 
1.2 
2.1 
3.7 
17.2 
4.5 
82.5 
 
 
1.7 
2.7 
28.1 
5.1 
10.6 
71.9 
 
73 
.. 
 
75 
33 
  48Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
High Income Countries 
Low Income Countries 
Europe & Central Asia  
Middle East & North Africa 
South Asia 
 
51 
36 
60 
77 
49 
.. 
.. 
71 
64 
54 
81 
78 
50 
56 
20 
72 
G) Total Merchandise Trade/GDP Ratio (%) 
World 
Low Income Countries 
SSA 
Developing Countries 
Latin America & Caribbean 
East Asia & the Pacific  
South Asia 
Middle East and North Africa 
Europe & Central Asia 
High Income Countries 
 
 
 
32.3 
23.6 
41.9 
32.5 
23.2 
47.1 
16.5 
43.5 
49.7 
32.3 
 
47.3 
41.1 
57.8 
59.2 
44.2 
74.6 
31.2 
57.6 
68.6 
43.9 
Notes: Classification of countries as low income or high income is done on the basis of Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita. Countries which have GNI per capita of $875 or less in 2005 
are classified as low income economies. Lower middle-income and upper middle-income 
economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $3,465. Middle-income economies are those with 
a GNI per capita of more than $875 but less than $10,726. High income economies are those 
with a GNI per capita of $10,726 or more. Nigeria had GNI per capita of $560 in 2005 and was 
ranked 170. 
 
Source: Computed from: World Development Indicators, 2000, 2007. 
 
Financial integration with world markets or financial globalization is the second major 
component of economic globalization, the other being trade integration. In my detailed empirical 
study of financial globalization in SSA, (Obadan, 2005b), I found that since the pace of financial 
globalization heightened in the 1990s in the developing world, a good number of SSA countries 
also succumbed to external pressures to liberalize the capital accounts of their balance of 
payments with a view to promoting capital flows and integrating with the world financial 
markets. Countries like Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, among 
others, have undertaken reforms and liberalized their capital accounts. Two measures of financial 
integration, employed in the empirical analysis, namely, savings – investment correlation and 
ratio of gross private capital flows to GDP (Table 4.2), revealed fairly low degrees of financial 
  49integration with the world financial markets for most SSA countries even though a good number 
of them had moved far in the direction of liberalizing their capital accounts. Even among the few 
that have fairly high ratios of capital flows to GDP, the ratios reflect more of capital flight, or 
returning capital inflows, or capital inflow into natural resources areas, for example, Angola, 
Republic of Congo and Gabon (Kasekende, 2000, World Bank, 2002; Obadan, op.cit).  
In the light of the above, SSA can be said to fall into the World Bank’s (2000) group of 
marginalized countries which integrate into world capital markets not through capital inflows but 
through capital flight. In this direction, by 1990, Africa, the region where capital is most scarce, 
had about 40 per cent of its private wealth held outside the continent, a higher proportion than 
any other region. Obadan’s findings further show that cases abound of financial liberalisation 
without financial integration and meaningful capital flows. UNCTAD (2000) had also reached a 
similar conclusion to the effect that efforts to integrate the Africa region into the global financial 
system and to attract private capital flows through a rapid liberalisation of the capital accounts 
have not resulted in increased inflows of such capital, but in greater volatility, with attendant 
consequences for exchange rate instability and misalignments.  
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Table  4.2:  Sub-Saharan Africa: Savings – Investment Correlation and Capital Flows 
Measures of Financial Globalization.  
Country / Measures of 
Financial Integration 
Savings 
Retention  
Ratio 
Ratio of Gross Private Capital  
Flows to GDP (%) (1986 – 2002) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.215  6.1 
Angola  
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkna Faso 
0.383 
0.256 
0.469 
-0.035 
15.3 
7.2 
5.2 
2.3 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
0.802 
0.704 
0.119 
0.554 
9.6 
n.a 
2.6 
2.7 
Equatorial Guinea  0.439  n.a 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guinea  
0.384 
0.526 
0.545 
1.9 
2.4 
2.8 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
1.337 
0.900 
10.9 
3.6 
  51Lesotho 
Madagascar 
-0.233 
0.447 
7.6 
2.2 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
0.353 
0.108 
0.221 
6.4 
20.9 
10.3 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
0.144 
-0.259 
0.350 
0.550 
12.4 
8.5 
n.a 
7.2 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
-0.218 
0.552 
0.034 
13.2 
5.6 
n.a 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
0.366 
0.560 
1.8 
7.2 
Source: Obadan  (2005b) 
Various reasons have been adduced for the limited private capital flows to Africa inspite of 
relatively open capital accounts (See, for example, Prasad, et al, 2003; Gordon and Bouvenberg 
in Brahmbatt, 1998). In SSA, however, the weak capital flows and financial integration have not 
been unconnected with the policy environments, underdeveloped financial markets, the 
detrimental effects of high debt burden, unfavourable economic and business environment, and 
premature liberalisation of the financial markets.   
Table 4.3:  Regional Growth of Exports and Imports of Goods and Services 
 
Region  
Exports Imports 
1990-2000 2000-2005 1990-2000 2000-2005 
World 
Low Income Countries 
Middle Income Countries 
Developing Countries 
East Asia & the Pacific  
Europe & Central Asia 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
High Income Countries 
6.9 
8.5 
7.3 
7.4 
11.0 
3.6 
8.5 
4.1 
9.5 
5.0 
6.8 
5.9 
11.5 
10.9 
11.0 
16.5 
9.8 
5.4 
5.2 
13.8 
3.7 
3.4 
6.9 
9.2 
6.6 
6.9 
10.4 
2.0 
10.7 
0.6 
10.6 
5.4 
7.0 
5.2 
13.9 
10.4 
10.8 
15.0 
11.5 
4.0 
8.4 
15.4 
7.8 
3.9 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, 2007 
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Poverty (Per cent) 
 Incidence  of 
Poverty (%) 
Share in Global 
Output (%) 
Average Annual 
Growth of GDP 
(%) 
  1981  2004 1990 2005 1990-
2000 
2000-
2005 
High Income Countries   ..  ..  60  54  2.7  2.2 
East Asia & Pacific   57.1  9.0  13  19  8.5  8.4 
Latin America & Caribbean  10.8  8.6  8  8  3.3  2.3 
Europe & Central Asia  0.7  0.9  7  7  -0.7  5.4 
South  Asia  51.6  32.0  6 8 5.6 6.5 
Middle  East  &  North  Africa  5.1 1.5  3 3 3.8 4.1 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  42.3  41.1  2 2 2.5 4.3 
World    40.6  18.4  .. .. 2.9 2.8 
 
Note:  Incidence of Poverty refers to the share of people living on less than US$1.0 a day. 
Source:  World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2007. 
 
Thus, as Obadan (2007b), UNECA (2007), World Bank. (2007), Stern (2002), and Gondwe 
(2001) have all correctly observed, openness is not enough for meaningful participation in 
globalization. Indeed, as Stern has stressed, open trade and investment policies will generate 
little or no benefits if other institutions are not in place or are bad.  
From the foregoing analysis of SSA’s trade and financial integration the following 
conclusions emerge.  
o  Measured by the share of total trade in GDP or of exports in GDP, SSA is more open 
than the high income countries and some other regions. Yet, SSA:  
-  has the least share of world trade (1.7% in 2005) whereas the high-income countries 
have the largest share of 71.9 per cent (Table 4.1); 
-  has the least share of manufactures in total exports (33%), excepting Middle-East and 
North Africa (20%), compared to 78 per cent for high-income countries and 81 per 
cent for East Asia and Pacific (Table 4.1); 
-  has low financial integration with world markets; 
-  has least share of world output (2% in 1990 and 2005, respectively) (Table 4.4); and 
-  had second least growth in exports in 2000 – 2005 (Table 4.3). 
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What is clear then is that the poor countries in Africa and elsewhere are not only the least 
integrated internationally, they have also derived the least benefits from globalization in terms of 
trade and financial flows. This means, as a number of analysts (Gondwe, 2001; World Bank, 
2005; Mason, 2001; UK-DFID, 2000; Khor, 2000; Obadan, 2001b; UNDP – Nigeria, 2001; 
Walker and Fox; 1999, Fischer, 2001, etc) have shown that the benefits of globalization have not 
occurred equally across countries. Daouas (2001) observes that “although globalization has 
helped increase growth and wealth in recent years, it has not done so for all countries. In the least 
developed countries and on the African continent, in particular, a worsening of existing 
imbalances has impeded development and aggravated poverty. The marginalization of these 
countries is reflected in their small share of world trade (barely 2%), output (not much higher), 
and foreign investment (1%)”. The UNDP (Nigeria) further portrayed the situation very vividly 
as follows:  
“the globalization process has been uneven and unbalanced, with uneven participation of 
countries and people in the expanding opportunities of globalization - in the global 
economy, in global technology, in global governance, and in global spread of cultures. 
Thus, while the collapse of space, time and borders may be creating a global village, 
unfortunately, not everyone can qualify for citizenship. The rich, the elite, the 
professional and the highly skilled face low borders but billions of people find the 
borders as high as ever. They are the recipients of the backlash effect of globalization 
while the rich and the elite nations and individuals are the beneficiaries of the spread 
effect”. 
 
No doubt, greater integration with the world economy through trade and financial flows 
has afforded some developing countries the avenue to partake in the opportunities and benefits of 
globalization, to develop their comparative advantages and gain access to newer, more 
appropriate technology, while financial liberalisation has increased their access to international 
private capital, permitting them to realize much higher rates of economic growth. The 
spectacular economic performances of the East Asian countries, the 1997/98 financial crisis 
notwithstanding, reflected significant benefits from globalization. But the same thing cannot be 
said of African countries, many of which are the world’s poorest. While economic growth rates 
in East Asia and the Pacific averaged 7.2, 7.1 and 8.7 per cent in 1981 – 90, 1991 – 99, and 2000 
– 05, respectively, those in Sub-Saharan Africa were just 1.8, 2.0, and 2.3 per cent, respectively. 
Furthermore, while the SSA’s GDP per capita was only US$746.0 in 2005, its real GDP per 
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East Asia, per capita incomes have been moving quickly toward levels in the industrial countries 
since 1970 (IMF, 2002). Thus, while higher trade and investment have spurred growth in some 
other regions, the same cannot be said of SSA. 
Related to the issue of poor growth performance is the incidence of poverty in Africa 
which is the highest in the world, standing at 41.1 per cent in 2005 for SSA alone (Fig. 6). The 
magnitude and dimension of the problem as well as the grave threat it poses to economic, social 
and political stability make it one of the biggest challenges facing the continent. Poverty is 
highly visible in most African countries. Overcrowded settlements in major urban areas without 
basic social services and remote and isolated rural areas are major concentrations of the poor. 
Compared with other developing regions, Africa suffers from more severe and persistent poverty 
as shown by various analyses, e.g., UNDP (1998); Kankwenda, et al (2000); World Bank 
(2001a). Approximately 45 per cent of Africans are income-poor (measured according to a 
poverty line of $1 a day) and 42 per cent suffer from the incidence of human poverty (defined by 
life expectancy, educational attainment and living conditions). Of the world’s 54 least developed 
countries, Africa comprises 33 (i.e. 61.0 per cent) while it also has 34 of the 45 lowest-ranked 
countries for human development (i.e. 75.6 per cent). 
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Furthermore, in SSA, one of the fall-outs of globalization is the very heavy external debt 
burden on the economies. In the context of relatively open economies and significant progress in 
liberalizing their exchange and trade regimes, many African countries have, until the recent debt 
reliefs, continued to stagnate and be frustrated under the burden of heavy external debt 
obligations. SSA countries have been among the most indebted of developing countries 
considering standard debt indicators and income levels (Obadan, 2004e; 2004f and 2005b). In 
the year 2000, out of 34 countries classified by the World Bank as severely indebted low-income 
countries, 28 are in Africa. Thus, Sub-Saharan African countries are not only among the poorest, 
they also suffer the biggest debt burden. The debt problem is intimately related to openness and 
the countries’ weak capacity for competitiveness and beneficial globalization. The heavy debt 
burdens may also not be unconnected with poor governance and corruption. The poor countries 
of Africa are characterized not only by low per capita incomes, but also by low social indicators 
(high illiteracy, infant mortality, poor health, etc), poor infrastructure and low economic 
diversification. In addition, they are afflicted by the problems of low rates of domestic saving 
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dependence on primary commodities. They have thus been ill-equipped to benefit much from the 
process of globalization.  
And, with the globalization process having been uneven and unbalanced, with uneven 
participation of countries and people in the expanding opportunities, globalization to poor 
countries is a force of iniquity and marginalization. They have yet to partake in the benefits of 
globalization, while their progress has been hindered by their disadvantaged participation in the 
global economy. The important question then is why Africa has lagged behind. Along with some 
other scholars, for example, Gondwe (2001), Fischer (2000), I have tried to answer this question, 
4.4 “ Why Has Africa Lagged Behind?” 
Africa has remained poor and lags behind other regions in exploiting the benefits of 
globalization, namely, increasing the resources available for productive investment, and 
enhancing efficiency of their use and facilitating the transfer of technologies. A number of 
mutually reinforcing factors account for the wide gap between Africa’s economic integration 
with the world markets and its potentials, and its stagnation/ underdevelopment at large. These 
relate to monocultural economies and the structure of production and export, low domestic 
investment, and the policy and institutional environment. Also, there is the issue of weak initial 
conditions reflecting lack of domestic economic capacity, and weak social infrastructure 
following the colonial experience. African countries have been made weaker by low export 
prices and significant terms of trade decline as well as the heavy burden of external debt 
servicing. Besides, is the issue of dictatorial regimes and poor governance characterized by abuse 
of power and economic mismanagement, all of which undermined the development process. Not 
least is SSA countries’ lack of or weak bargaining and negotiating power in international 
economic relations.  
Two of the above factors are particularly significant, namely, monocultural 
economies/overdependence on primary commodities and low level of industrialization and 
manufactured exports. These are well-acknowledged constraints (see for example, World Bank, 
2000b, 2005; Obadan, 2001b, 2004a, etc). Many African countries depend heavily on primary 
commodities for the bulk of their export receipts, and this has often caused serious problems for 
economic management. This is because primary commodities prices tend to be volatile and are 
subject to long-term cycles as well as to short-term booms and busts. Not only are African 
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Nigeria presents an extreme case with its dependence on one commodity – crude oil for over 95 
per cent of export earning and over 80 per cent for domestic revenue. The two features of 
monoculture and concentration in primary commodity export coupled with the corollary of 
insignificant manufactured exports have mutually interacted to hinder Africa’s effective 
participation in the globalization process. Africa currently accounts for far less a percentage of 
the world trade in manufactures than it achieved in 1980. (Sachs and Sievers, 1999). Specifically, 
in 2000 and 2006, Africa’s shares of world manufactured exports were just 0.8 and 0.9 per cent, 
respectively.  Yet, manufactured exports have been the key to the effective participation of the 
countries in East Asia in the globalization process and the spectacular growth rates and poverty 
reduction levels achieved. Manufactured export-oriented growth was an important part of the 
strategy that made dramatic inroads into income poverty in East Asia. In 1975, some 57 per cent 
of their population was in poverty. By 2004, after about three decades of rapid growth, their 
headcount rate of poverty was only 9.0 per cent (U.K – DFID, 2000; World Bank, 2007).  
Therefore, under globalization, African economies need to diversify, using modern 
technology, into high-value-added products for export to the world market. But so far, African 
manufacturing has been uncompetitive internationally. The policy environment and national 
business climate have not promoted a high level of competitiveness while many other factors 
raise transactions costs and inhibit manufactured exports. Among the latter are high tax rates and 
numerous regulations, infrastructure failings, high level of corruption and inflation, and policy 
and political instability. Under the circumstances, as Obadan (2004a) and Obadan and Obioma 
(1999) have argued, even an efficient manufacturing activity tends to have a low ratio of value 
added to product price. 
In the light of the foregoing, Africa needs to address a number of challenges if it is to 
accelerate its integration into the world economy, maximize the benefits of globalization and 
minimize the risks of destabilization and marginalization as well as promote rapid economic 
growth and achieve substantial poverty reduction. Box 4.2 summarizes the challenges. 
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o  Developing a strong production base predicated on value-added products; 
o  diversification of export structures and development of manufactured export capability. 
Empirical evidence has shown that export of products with no value added has been a 
major element in the poverty of the heavily indebted poor countries; in contrast, 
successful globalizing economies are those which diversify their export portfolios and 
lesson their dependence on natural resources or commodities as the key exports. The 
challenge is how to use the traditional exports as the basis for diversification which 
countries like Malaysia have successfully done. Diversification does not relate to   
products alone, but also to trading partners;  
o  development of adequate human and institutional capacity, physical infrastructure, access 
to markets, capital and technology, necessary for integration into the world economy; 
o  designing and implementing sound economic policies to be able to sustain the confidence 
of financial markets and square up to the increasingly stiff competition in trade; and  
o  developing and operating within the framework of strong regional and sub-regional 
economic groupings such as ECOWAS, SADC, etc, as a credible response to the 
powerful force of globalization. Today’s world, under the current of the powerful forces 
of globalization, is divided into regional trading blocks. Thus, we have for example, in 
Europe (EU); North America (NAFTA), Asia ((ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Rim (APEC), 
Africa (COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC, etc), Central America (CACM), North Africa 
(UMA) and South Asia (SAARC).
8 These regional groupings have generally worked 
towards promoting openness, competitiveness and trade. 
Source: Obadan  (2001b) 
 
 
5.  NIGERIA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY  
As was observed earlier, international trade, investment and financial flows, technology 
and movements of people across national borders are the key hallmarks of economic 
globalization. Increasing flows of these give rise to increasing integration of world economies. 
Increasing openness, reflected in the lowering of trade barriers, financial liberalisation, as well as 
lowering of restrictions on movements of people, provides the framework for increasing 
integration of the global economy and reaping of benefits from globalization. Thus, one area that 
has elicited my attention relates to the nature of integration of the Nigerian economy with the 
global economy and how much benefits derived from globalization. Accordingly, two of the 
                                                 
8 The full names of the regional blocs mentioned are: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
South African Development Community (SADC); European Union (EU); North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA); Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC); Central American Common Market (CACM), Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). 
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with global markets?. 
5.1  Openness of the Economy and Its Integration with the World Economy  
 
Openness and Trade integration:  
One common indicator that economists use in measuring a country’s degree of openness to the 
rest of the world is its share of total trade (exports plus imports) in its gross domestic product, 
that is, the size of foreign trade in relation to the size of the economy. Data on this indicator 
reveal that the Nigerian economy is relatively very open as shown in Obadan (1996b and 2001d). 
Table 5.1 shows that Nigeria’s index of openness increased from an average of 43.5 per cent in 
1975 – 70 to 71.8 per cent in 1995 – 98. From 2002 – 2005, the index stood at 51.9 per cent. This 
is relatively high compared to the index of openness of some industrial countries. 
 
Table 5.1 
Relative significance of Nigeria’s External Trade and Degree of Openness (Per Cent) 
  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98 2002-05 
Exports/GDP  (%)  23.28 18.78 21.04 34.58 41.93 33.13 
Imports/GDP  (%)  20.24 18.34 12.76 22.72 29.90 18.25 
Total  Trade/GDP(%)  43.50 37.14 33.78 57.28 71.83 51.93 
Share  of  World  Exports  (%)  1.00 0.84 0.36 0.32 0.24 0.24 
Share  of  World  Imports  (%)  0.82 0.78 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.135 
Share of Total World Trade (%)  0.92  0.81  0.28  0.25  0.20  0.26 
 
Source:  Computed from: IMF, International Financial Statistics Year Book, 1999; World 
Bank, World Economic Indicators, 2000, 2007; Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Statistical Bulletin, December, 1998 and 2006. 
For example, in 2005, the index of openness of some industrial countries were as follows: United 
States of America (21:2%); Japan (24.5%); Australia (31.6%); Italy (42.2%); United Kingdom 
(39.7%). However, some developing country globalizers such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, Chile, China, etc., have higher indices of openness than Nigeria. But these 
countries are more integrated with the world economy than Nigeria considering various output, 
trade and financial indicators. Indeed, inspite of Nigeria’s relative openness, the degree of her 
integration with the global economy is low as shown as follows (Obadan, 2001d; Owolabi, 
1998): 
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and Fig.7 show, the country’s share of total world trade declined from an average of 0.92 in 
1975 -79 to 0.26 in 2002 – 2005. The shares of exports and imports in world exports and 
imports, respectively, have exhibited similar downward trends. The very poor performance of 
non-oil exports contributed to the rather poor performance of Nigeria’s share in global 
exports. 
ii)   
 
 
ii) Related to the above is Nigeria’s share of global output which is also relatively low. Table 5.2 
shows various globalization indicators for Nigeria and 20 developing countries that have been 
described as ‘new globalisers’ because of their active participation in the globalization process 
and the impact the phenomenon has had on them. Nigeria is one of the six countries with the 
lowest share of world output. Brazil, India and the Republic of Korea account for as much as 1.8 
per cent of world output. Besides, many of the countries, until the last few years, also had much 
higher economic growth rates than Nigeria. And judged by per capita income, Nigeria is the 
poorest of all the countries listed in the table with a per capita income of only US$560 in 2005. 
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 Table 5.2: Globalization Indicators for Nigeria and some Developing  
                  Country Globalizers, 2005 
New 
Globalizers 
& Nigeria         
Economic Growth (%)  Share in 
global output 
(%) 
Export / 
GDP  
(%) 
Imports/GDP 
(%) 
Share in 
World Trade 
(%) 
GCF/GDP 
(%) 
FDI/GDP 
(inflows) (%) 
Share of 
Manufacturing 
in Exports  (% 
of Total) 
Incidence of 
Poverty (%) 
Gross 
National 
Income Per 
Capita ($) 
1990 -2000  2000 – 2005 
Argentina   4.3  2.2  0.4  21.9  15.7  0.33  0.3  2.6  31  -  4,47 
Brazil 2.9  2.2  1.8  14.9  9.7  0.93  0.2  1.9  54  21.5  3,550 
Chile 6.6  4.3  0.3  35.2  28.2  0.35  0.6  5.8  14  -  5,870 
China 10.6  9.6  0.5  34.1  29.5  6.73  0.3  3.5  92  17.0  1,740 
Dominica   6.0  2.8  0.1  20.8  32.6  0.07  0.2  3.5  -  42.2  2,460 
Ecuador 1.9  5.1  0.1  27.7  28.3  0.10  0.4  4.5  9  46.0  2,620 
India 6.0  7.0  1.8  11.8 28.3  1.09 0.2  0.8  70  28.6  730 
Indonesia 4.2  4.7  0.7  30.0  24.2  0.74  0.2  1.8  47  27.1  1,280 
Mauritius 5.2  4.0  0.0  34.1  11.9  0.03 0.4  0.6  70 -  5,250 
Malaysia 7.0  4.8  0.3  108.2  87.9  1.21  0.3  3.0  75  -  4,970 
Mexico 3.1  1.9  1.7  27.8  30.1  2.11  0.2  2.4  77  17.6  7,310 
Hong Kong  4.1  4.3  0.4  164.4  169.0  2.80  2.4  20.2  96  -  27,670 
Korea (Rep. 
of ) 
5.8 4.6 1.8 36.1  33.2 2.58  0.2 0.6 91  -  15,840 
Nicaragua 3.7  3.0  0.0  17.5  52.8  0.02  0.2  4.9  11  47.9  950 
Peru 4.7  4.3  0.2  21.7 15.7  0.14 0.3  3.2  17  53.1 2,650 
Singapore 7.6  4.2  0.3  196.7  171.3  2.03  2.9  17.2  81  -  27,580 
Thailand   4.2  5.4  0.4  62.3  66.9  1.08  0.4  2.6  77  -  2,720 
Columbia 2.8  3.5  0.3  17.3  17.3  0.20  0.5  8.5  36  64.0  2,290 
Venezuela 1.6  1.3  0.3  39.6  17.3  0.38  0.6  2.1  9  -  4,820 
Nigeria   2.5  5.9  0.2  42.7  17.4  0.28  0.9  2.0  2  54.6  560 
Note: GCF – gross capital flows; FDI – foreign direct investment  
Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics Year Book (2006); World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2007. 
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New Globalizers & 
Nigeria                     
Merchandise Trade (% 
of GDP) 
Growth of Export Value 
(average)(%) 
1990  2005  1980 - 1990  1990 - 2005 
Argentina   11.6  37.5  -  7.8 
Brazil 11.7  24.6  4.6  5.9 
Chile 51.1  63.4  9.2  9.4 
China  32.5 63.6  13.6 15.6 
Dominica   73.2  53.4  -0.9  3.5 
Ecuador 44.2  55.9  7.1  4.7 
India 13.1  28.5  4.2  11.5 
Indonesia 41.5  54.2  7.6 5.9 
Mauritius 118.0  84.3  -  3.6 
Malaysia 133.4  196.1  4.8  11.4 
Mexico  32.1 58.0  15.3 12.4 
Hong Kong  217.4  333.3  15.4  7.9 
Korea (Rep. of )  51.1  69.3  12.4  14.8 
Nicaragua 95.9  70.3  -4.8 8.6 
Peru 22.3  37.4  2.7  10.0 
Singapore 308.1  368.0  12.1  10.3 
Thailand    65.7 129.3  13.8 9.2 
Columbia 30.7  34.6  7.9 4.4 
Venezuela 52.8  56.9  3.4  2.4 
Nigeria   67.5  60.2  -4.4  1.9 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
iii) Nigeria’s export growth performance has been very poor compared to the performances of many 
other developing country globalizers (Table 5.3 and Fig. 8). For example, between 1980 and 
1990, Nigeria’s export growth performance averaged – 4.4 per cent compared to the very high 
growth rates of many other countries. The positive growth rate which averaged 1.9 per cent over 
the 1990 – 2005 period was still very much below those of many others. The country thus faces a 
major challenge of enhancing the economy’s competitiveness and reforming the export structure 
in order to reap maximum benefits from globalization. 
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iv) Table 5.4 shows Nigeria’s current account balances which should normally provide a 
measure of the country’s net inflow and outflow of capital. The huge current account surpluses, 
reflecting large savings, up till 1992 and from the last five years, tended to suggest a high level 
of integration with the global financial markets. But this was not the case due to the absence of 
an enabling environment and the non-internationalization of the capital market until the last few 
  65years. For a long time, the observed outflows in the capital account of the balance of payments 
reflected debt service payments on the nation’s huge external debt owed mainly to the Paris Club 
of official creditors (Obadan, 2002a, 2004e). 
 
Table 5.4:  Nigeria’s GDP and Balance of Payments on Current Account   
Year  GDP at Current Factor Cost 
(N mn) 
Current Account 
Balance (N mn) 
Current Account Balance as a 
Percentage of GDP (%) 
1980 49,632.3 13,057.9 26.3
1981 50,456.6 10,070.3 20.0
1982 51,570.3 7,980.9 15.5
1983 56,709.8 6,752.3 11.9
1984 63,006.2 8,234.3 13.1
1985 71,368.1 10,736.9 15.0
1986 72,128.2 8,006.6 11.1
1987 106,883.2 17,138.2 16.0
1888 142,678.3 31,586.1 22.1
1989 222,457.6 59,112.0 26.6
1990 257,873.0 79,810.1 30.9
1991 320,247.3 51,969.8 16.2
1992 544,330.7 93,680.5 17.2
1993 691,600.0 -34,414.7 (5.0)
1994 911,070.0 -52,304.3 (5.7)
1995 1,960,690.0 -186,084.6 (9.5)
1996 2,740,460.0 240,180.0 8.8
1997 2,834,800.0 36,033.6 1.3
1998 2,721,510.0 -330,109.0 (12.1)
1999 3,377,330.0 42,295.7 1.3
2000 4,537,640.0 713,023.9 16.1
2001 4,685,972.2 108,996.0 23.3
2002 5,403,006.8 -117,037.3 (2.2)
2003 6,947,819.9 704,560.0 10.1
2004 11,411,066.9 2,056,326.3 18.0
2005 14,610,881.5 4,205,009.1 28.8
2006 18,564,594.7 4,462,941.1 24.0
Source:  Central Bank of Nigeria. Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 9. No. 2, December 1998 
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December, 1999, 2004 and 2006 
 
Degree of Financial Globalization / Integration.  
Financial integration is expected to reflect in the degree of capital flows so that a high 
degree of capital account liberalisation and financial openness should result in a large volume of 
realized capital flows. But, as was shown in the case of SSA countries earlier, some poor 
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liberalisation (in the sense of having few or no restrictions on capital flows), but have not 
achieved financial integration in the sense that they experience minimal capital flows. Others 
experience significant capital flight which suggests involuntary financial integration (driven by 
capital flight). In order to shed light on Nigeria’s case, Obadan (2005b) employed two measures 
of financial integration, namely, the savings-investment correlation test and the ratio of gross 
capital flows to GDP (See Prasad, et al, 2003; Montiel, 1993; Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). The 
latter measure is a direct measure of financial integration as it captures de facto financial 
integration in terms of realized capital flows. On the other hand, the former posits that under 
complete financial integration, the regression coefficient of investment on saving rates should be 
zero as all countries are able to borrow and lend in integrated world markets. But where the 
coefficient is close to unity, it suggests much less financial integration and presence of 
restrictions on capital movements. (Obadan, 2005b). 
My estimates of savings – investment correlation coefficients for Nigeria over the period, 
1987 – 2002, revealed negative correlation coefficients of –0.214 and -0.259, which results are 
perverse in relation to theoretical expectations. For most of the years, investment was higher than 
savings, thus implying that the country financed its excess investment over saving rates by 
foreign private and public savings, perhaps more of the latter. But the ratio of gross capital flow 
to GDP was just 8.5 per cent compared to much higher ratios for some other SSA countries over 
the same period: Angola (15.3%); Guinea Bissau (10.1%); Mauritania (20.9%); Mauritius 
(10.3%); Namibia (12.4%); Sierra Leone (13.2%) (Table 2.2). Nigeria also had low gross foreign 
direct investment/GDP ratios compared to some other countries, thus, portraying low financial 
integration. Table 5.2 shows that Nigeria’s gross capital flows and foreign direct investment 
flows are relatively low compared to the “new globalizing countries” such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Chile, China, Nicaragua, etc.  
The above findings from Obadan (2005b) underscore two points. First, the savings – 
investment correlation results tend to confirm the inherent problems of the poor underlying data. 
Indeed, the World Bank’s African Development Indicators, 2004, observed that the gross 
national savings and gross national investment figures for Nigeria were distorted from 1994 
because the official exchange rate used by government for oil   exports and oil value added was 
significantly overvalued. Second, is the point that even though Nigeria and many other SSA 
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Even among the few that have high realized capital flows, they reflect more of capital flight or 
returning capital inflows into natural resource areas.  
Overall, although the various measures indicate that the Nigerian economy is relatively 
open and liberalized, it has not integrated with the global economy in any meaningful way. And 
in the view of Owolabi (1998), the integration of the country seems difficult in the present 
circumstances because the necessary capabilities for inter-industry trade cannot easily be 
developed in the near future. The notable challenges will be outlined later in this lecture.  
5.2  Globalization and Nigeria’s Trade 
The potential power of trade in economic growth and poverty reduction is largely acknowledged 
in the literature (See, for example, Ajayi (2007), Tupy (2005), Nwaba (1999), World Bank 
(2002). The nature of empirical relationship between trade and economic growth has also been 
explored substantially (See, for example, Feder, 1983; Krueger, 1983; Obadan, 1986a; Fosu, 
1990; Soderbom and Teal, 2003; Edwards, 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Iyoha, 2002). Most 
of these report a positive and significant relationship between exports and economic growth. The 
Monterrey Consensus (2003) characterized “international trade as an engine for development” 
and affirmed that “a universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral 
trading system, as well as a meaningful trade liberalisation, can substantially stimulate 
development world-wide, benefiting countries at all stages of development”.  Indeed, in some 
economies trade has been found to perform the role of engine of growth, especially via high real 
productivity export sectors (Obadan, 1994b). Furthermore, the export success of the past three 
decades which has thrown up a number of newly industrializing developing countries (NICs), 
especially in Asia and Latin America, has provided the primary impetus for arguments by new 
classical economists that developing countries’ economic growth is best served by export 
promotion and allowing market forces and free enterprise to prevail while minimizing 
government intervention in the economy in an era of globalization. The important question, at 
this juncture, relates to how Nigeria has fared in trade under globalization. In a number of 
studies, I have tried to address this issue, for example, in (Obadan, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 
1989a, 1993b, 1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 2001d) 
Foreign trade, historically, has been of vital significance to the Nigerian economy. The 
country depends heavily on exports to earn foreign exchange which finances the importation of 
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equipment for agricultural and industrial development. Besides, foreign trade provides 
employment for those directly involved in export and import trade. From a relatively low base of 
N330 million naira in 1960, the value of total exports has shown remarkable upward growth 
particularly since the period of structural adjustment programme when the large depreciation of 
the naira exchange rate led to substantial increases in the value of merchandise exports (Obadan, 
1996a). And so, the value of export which stood at only N8.9 billion in 1986 rose to N109.9 
billion in 1990 and N6,372.1 billion in 2005. The provisional figure for 2006 is N5,752.7 billion. 
However, considered in per capita U.S dollar terms, exports have showed declining performance 
over time excepting the last few years when very high crude oil prices in the world market raised 
the export earnings in both naira and U.S dollars. Export earnings per capita were as high as 
US$401.4 in 1980. But thereafter, it declined continuously and drastically to US$82.6 in 1988. 
However, by 1996, the earnings improved significantly to US$539.3. But as at 2006, export 
earnings per capita at US$319.4 were less than the value in 1980 (Fig.  9). Even with Nigeria’s 
significantly enhanced oil earnings, the WTO ranked Nigeria as the 43
rd exporter in 2006 with a 
share in world exports of only 0.4 per cent.  
 
Figure 9: Nigeria's Export Earnings Per Capita 
(US Dollar) 
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Table 5.5:  Nigeria: Growth of Oil and Non-Oil Exports, 1970 – 2006. 
Year   Total 
Exports(N’ 
million) 
Oil Export 
(N’ 
million) 
% Share 
of Oil 
Exports 
(%) 
Growth 
of Oil 
Exports 
(%) 
Non-Oil 
Exports 
(N’ 
million) 
% Share 
of Non-
Oil 
Exports 
(%) 
Growth 
of Non-
Oil 
Exports 
(%) 
1970 885.4 510.0 57.6 94.4 375.4 42.4 0.9
1975 4,922.5 4,560.9 92.7 -15.0 361.6 7.3 -15.7
1980 14,186.7 13,632.3 96.1 33.0 554.4 3.9  -17.3
1985 11,214.8 10,890.6 97.1 23.2 324.2 2.9  31.0
1990 109,886.1 106,626.5 97.0 93.8 3,259.6 3.0  10.3
1991 121,533.7 116,856.5 96.2 9.6 4,677.2 3.8  43.5
1992 205,611.7 201,383.9 97.9 72.3 4,227.8 2.1  -9.6
1993 218,770.1 213,778.8 97.7 6.2 1,991.3 2.3  18.1
1994 206,059.2 200,710.2 97.4 -6.1 5,349.0 2.6  6.5
1995 950,661.4 927,565.3 97.5 362.1 23,096.1 2.4  331.8
1996 1,309,543.4 1,286,215.9 98.2 38.7 23,327.5 1.8  1.0
1997 1,241,662.7 1,212,499.4 97.6 -5.7 29,163.3 2.3  25.0
1998 751,856.7 717,786.5 95.5 -40.8 34,070.2 4.5  16.8
1999 1,188,969.8 1,169,476.9 98.4 62.9 19,492.9 1.6  -42.8
2000 1,945,723.3 1,920,900.4 98.7 64.3 24,822.9 1.3  27.3
2001 2,001,230.8 1,973,222.2 98.6 2.7 28,008.6 1.4  12.8
2002 1,882,668.2 1,787,622.1 95.0 -9.4 95,046.13 5.0  239.3
2003 3,098,184.9 3,003,092.4 96.8 66.7 95,092.5 3.2  0.05
2004 4,620,085.2 4,506,349.9 97.8 50.0 113,735.3 2.2  19.6
2005 6,372,052.4 6,266,096.6 98.3 39.1 105,955.8 1.3  -6.8
2006 5,752,747.7 5,619,152.9 97.7 -10.3 133,594.9 .2.3  26.1
Source: CBN: Annual Reports; Statistical Bulletin (Various Issues) 
Trends in Nigeria’s exports have, over the years, been determined in varying degrees by 
the interaction of many factors, among which are: foreign demand as reflected in the growth rate 
of output in the industrial countries; prices and volume of crude oil exports and the prices of 
agricultural commodities, especially cocoa and natural rubber; trade and economic policies 
pursued by the industrial countries; competition in the world market between OPEC and non-
OPEC oil exporters; and energy policies of the industrial consuming countries as reflected in 
their various conservation efforts and/or quest for greater use of alternative sources of energy. 
(Obadan, 1996a and 1996b).  
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The value of Nigeria’s merchandise imports has tended to grow very fast over the years. 
From a value of N0.432 billion in 1960, imports rose to N12.8 billion in 1981. The economic 
crisis which ensued in the early 1980s and the subsequent economic stabilization measures led to 
a sharp reduction in the volume and value of imports. But the growth momentum of imports 
picked up again in 1985 and the upward trend was maintained thereafter such that as at 2006, the 
value of total imports was N2,528.1 billion or 5,855 times the 1960 figures. As in the case of 
exports, the sharp depreciation of the naira from the SAP era partly accounts for the observed 
substantial growth in the naira value of imports. One notable feature of imports is the dominance 
of producer goods, namely capital goods and raw materials, in the import basket over the years 
(Table 5.6 and Fig. 11). This is due to the need for capital goods to meet the requirements of the 
various development plans and industrialization. As the country does not produce capital goods 
and adequate raw materials, it had to increase their importation. Consumer goods imports, 
particularly imports of food, have also been quite significant. As at 2002, food imports accounted 
for 11.2 per cent of total imports. 
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Figure 11:  Nigeria's Structure of Imports 
(1970 - 2006) (Per cent)
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A number of factors are suggestive as important determinants of the magnitude and 
structure of imports into Nigeria. They include increased income and foreign exchange levels of 
the oil boom eras, dependence of the economy on foreign technology and industrial inputs, 
domestic economic policies aimed at promoting agricultural and industrial development, the 
needs of the various national development plans and programmes, and trade and commercial 
policies. Obadan (1985) undertook a comprehensive estimate of import demand functions and 
elasticities for Nigeria. Unlike previous studies, the nature of desegregation effected allowed 
appropriate components of income to be employed as determinants of different import categories 
based on end-use. The empirical analysis revealed the importance of income and other variables 
as determinants of imports. In particular, it shed light on the roles of such factors as relative 
prices, foreign exchange availability and trade restrictions in influencing import demand and 
their implications for policy. For example, the analysis showed the high statistical significance of 
foreign exchange availability and trade restrictions in import demand. It revealed that tariffs have 
been effective in reducing consumer goods imports, especially non-durables including textiles. 
Also, imports of capital goods were found to be primarily determined by income, price and 
  72foreign exchange reserves. One very important finding from that study relates to the estimated 
import elasticities. They showed that the demand for various import items is generally income 
and price inelastic. And the very low price elasticities tended to cast great doubt on exchange 
rate stability and devaluation as an instrument of import control. Hence, the study was not in 
favour of any official policy geared towards devaluing the naira.  
 
Table 5.6:  Nigeria’s Imports by Major Groups (1970 – 2006)  
(Percentage of Total) 
Year  Consumer Goods  Capital Goods & Raw Materials  Others  Total  
Capital Goods  Raw Materials  Total  
1970 28.8  37.7  31.0  68.7  2.5  100.0 
1972 36.0  37.0  26.2  63.2  0.8  100.0 
1974 29.2  37.2  33.0  70.2  0.6  100.0 
1976 30.5  43.7  25.5  69.2  0.3  100.0 
1978 29.0  47.6  23.3  70.9  0.1  100.0 
1980 39.6  33.5  26.8  60.3  0.1  100.0 
1982 41.6  32.8  25.1  57.9  0.5  100.0 
1984 37.0  32.2  29.7  61.9  1.1  100.0 
1986 29.6  40.8  29.5  70.3  0.1  100.0 
1988 28.7  32.0  39.2  71.2  0.1  100.0 
1990 26.7  40.5  32.8  73.3  0.0  100.0 
1992 33.8  31.7  33.9  65.6  0.6  100.0 
1994 35.8  24.8  39.1  63.9  0.3  100.0 
1996 38.7  19.2  42.0  61.2  0.1  100.0 
1998 39.0  19.9  40.8  60.7  0.3  100.0 
2000 38.8  21.1  39.8  60.9  0.3  100.0 
2002 39.2  20.9  39.4  60.4  0.4  100.0 
2004 46.2  23.8  29.7  53.5  0.3  100.0 
2006 47.0  23.6  28.8  52.4  0.6  100.0 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Nigeria. Annual Reports. Various Issues.  
 
Various analyses, for example, Obadan, 1986b, 1993b, 1996a, 1996b, and 1989; Ojo, 
1989; Falegan, 1978; Obi, 1978; have revealed deep concerns about the features of Nigeria’s 
foreign trade, particularly exports. First, is the primary product-based and undiversified nature 
and structure of exports coupled with the monocultural nature of the economy. The export 
structure (Table 5.7 and 5.12) show that Nigeria, like many other African countries, depends 
heavily on the export of primary commodities for the bulk of her foreign exchange receipts and 
  73domestic revenue, and this has often caused serious problems for economic management. 
Nigeria’s situation is further aggravated by the fact that the economy has become moncultural 
since crude oil began to make a significant impact from the early 1970s. In the colonial period, 
up to the late 1960s, Nigeria’s primary commodity production and export base was relatively 
diversified with products such as cocoa, rubber, palm oil and kernel, groundnuts, cotton, ginger, 
benniseed, etc. Indeed, the agricultural sub-sector dictated, to a larger extent, the pace of growth 
and development of the Nigerian economy with substantial contributions to the GDP, rural 
incomes, development capital, foreign exchange earnings and the pace of industrialization (Ojo, 
1989; Obadan,1993b) 
Figure 12:Structure of Nigeria's Mechandise 
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Table 5.7:   Nigeria’s Export of Major Commodities by Economic Sectors  
(Percentage of Total Export Values) 
Commodity    1970 1974 1978  1980 1982 1984  1986 1988 1990  1992 1994 1996  1998 2005 2006 
Major Agricultural (Including Forest Products)  30.0  4.7  6.8  92.4  0.9 2.3  4.6 9.1 2.6  1.5 1.3 1.0  0.7 0.6 0.9 
Cocoa  15.0  2.7 6.2  2.2 0.6 2.0  4.2 7.9 1.1  0.7 0.9 0.6  0.6 0.2 0.3 
Palm  Kernels  2.5 0.7 0.2  0.1 0.26  0.1  0.1 0.3 1.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rubber  2.0 0.6 0.2  0.1 0.1 0.2  0.3 0.9 0.3  0.3 0.3 0.4  0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mineral  Products  57.8 92.6 89.1  96.1 98.8 0.4  93.8 88.4 97.0  97.9 97.4 98.2  95.5 98.4 97.9 
Petroleum  57.6 92.6 89.1  96.1 98.8 97.3  93.8 88.4 97.0  97.9 97.4 98.2  95.5 98.3 97.8 
Processed and Semi-Processed Agricultural  Products 3.0 0.6 0.5  0.2 0.2 0.4  0.6 0.3 0.2  0.4 0.2 0.2  0.2 0.7 0.9 
Manufactured  Exports    0.6 0.2 -  3.0 -  -  -  0.2 0.3  0.3 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.2 0.3 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Nigeria. Annual Reports; Statistical Bulletin (Various Issues). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  75Solid minerals, mainly in the form of tin metal, columbite, lead and zinc, also played a fairly 
significant role in generating foreign exchange for the country. Both the primary agricultural 
products and solid minerals dominated the export structure up to the late 1960s. But the positive 
role of the export crop sub-sector in the post-independence period was not sustained from the 
1970s. Crude oil became the dominant trade item with relative share in export earnings and 
domestic revenue generation increasing significantly at the expense of non-oil exports, 
particularly agricultural products (Table 5.5). Thus, in 1970, crude oil contributed 57.6 per cent 
of export earnings and just 26.3   per cent of total federally collected revenue. By 1980, crude 
oil’s contribution to total export earnings was a staggering 96.1 per cent while its contribution to 
government’s revenue was 81.1 per cent. As at 2006, petroleum accounted for 97.6 per cent of 
total export receipts and 88.6 per cent of domestic revenue. The percentage share of non-oil 
exports declined steadily in the reverse manner (Fig.  13). 
 
 
Figure 13:   Share of Oil and Non-oil Exports in Nigeria's Total Exports
(Per cent)
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Besides the phenomenon of declining share of non-oil exports in total exports, there is the 
notable feature of disappearance of some erstwhile significant agricultural commodities from the 
export list, e.g., palm oil, groundnut, ginger, and hides and skins. Apart from the adverse effect 
  76of the ‘Dutch disease’, occasioned by petroleum oil, various factors have tended to constrain the 
exports of traditional agricultural commodities (see Obadan, 1993b; 1986b; 1989a; and Ojo, 
1989). Among the factors are: low production and decline in export volumes, high population 
growth rates and increased local consumption of some products, low international demand for 
non-oil exports because of development of synthetic substitutes, discriminatory tariffs and the 
new entrants into the international  commodity markets. There have also been problems of 
infrastructural constraint, smuggling of export produce, etc.  
What then comes to the fore is the failure of the various policy measures, aimed at export 
diversification over the past three decades, to achieve the desired results. And so, Nigeria’s 
exports continue to reflect a one commodity structure, featuring the dominance of oil. This has 
made the economy to be very vulnerable to short-term booms and busts. With the characteristic 
‘Dutch Disease’ effect of the oil sector, the non-oil sector of the economy has suffered 
irreparable damage. That sector of the economy became characterized by wanton neglect, weak 
production base, poor technological base, low productivity and low level of competitiveness. 
Structural imbalances in the economy became magnified. And as I had concluded (Obadan, 
2001d) the two features of monoculture and concentration in primary products exports have 
mutually interacted to hinder Nigeria’s effective participation in the globalization process. 
A second worrisome feature of Nigeria’s exports is the very insignificant contribution of 
manufactures to export earnings. Export of manufactures and semi-manufactures of agricultural 
products has been quite disappointing over the years. Its share in total exports declined from 3.0 
per cent in 1980 to 0.5 per cent in 1990. As at 2006, it was just 0.3 per cent (Table 5.7). This is 
hardly surprising considering the inward-looking nature of the import-substituting industries with 
concentration on consumer goods and the fact that manufacturing has yet to have firm roots and 
play a meaningful role in the economy. Its contribution to the gross domestic product is very 
low, averaging only 4.1 per cent from 2001 – 2006 (Table 5.8). As Obadan (2001d) has shown, 
the production base for manufacturing has gradually deteriorated over the years with installed 
capacity being increasingly unutilized because of numerous constraints including uncompetitive- 
ness of the products arising from high cost of production; low effective demand; infrastructural 
bottlenecks; foreign exchange constraint; and inconsistent and often destabilizing 
macroeconomic policies. Thus, average manufacturing capacity utilisation which was 72.3 per 
cent in 1975 – 82 declined to 37.9 per cent over the 1983 – 98 period. As at 2000, capacity 
  77utilisation was only 34 per cent, less than half of the 1970s figures. However, some improvement 
has been noticeable in recent years (Table 5.8). This table also reveals deteriorating average 
manufacturing growth rates over the years.  
The inward-looking nature of manufacturing which has produced only 8 per cent of Nigerian 
firms as exporters (Soderbom and Teal, 2003) has not helped manufactured exports. This 
situation contrasts with the experiences of the NICs – Brazil, India Mexico, Korea, Turkey and 
Hong Kong- which have diversified into high-technology industries within the framework of 
outward – oriented development (Obadan, 1993b)  And very importantly, as was noted earlier, 
manufactured exports have been key to the effective participation of the countries in East Asia in 
the globalization process and the spectacular growth rates and poverty reduction levels achieved 
 
 
 
Table 5.8: Economic Growth, Manufacturing Growth and Capacity Utilisation in Nigeria 
Period Real  GDP 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
Average 
Manufacturing 
Growth (%) 
Average 
Manufacturing 
Capacity 
Utilisation (%) 
Average 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
(%) 
1970 -1974  n.a  10.1  n.a  n.a 
1975 – 1979  n.a  23.1  74.5  n.a 
1980 – 1984  3.7  -1.5  59.6  9.3* 
1985 – 1989  5.7  13.0  40.1  8.3 
1990 -1994  4.0  -0.2  37.1  7.9 
1995 – 1998  2.8  -1.9  33.9  6.4 
1999 – 2000  3.3  3.7  53.3  7.1 
2001 – 2006  6.1  8.9  52.9  4.1 
Note: * average for 1981 – 84. 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (2000), and Annual Reports (Various Issues) 
Even though Nigeria and other African countries have the advantage of low real wage 
levels compared to most other regions including Asia, their manufacturing has been 
uncompetitive internationally. The Africa Competitiveness Index 2000 ranked Nigeria 20
th out of 
24 countries, underscoring the relative uncompetitiveness of the Nigerian economy. Also, the 
World Economic Forum’s 2006 Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) ranked Nigeria 101
st 
world-wide out of the 125 countries surveyed. Besides, the country lost 34 places (falling to rank 
112) in the basic requirements sub-index which highlights the fundamentals for achieving 
  78sustained growth, namely, strong institutions, adequate infrastructure, a supportive 
macroeconomic environment, and good basic health and education. The Forum expressed 
concern that despite Nigeria’s tremendous oil wealth and competitive potential its indices had 
remarkably deteriorated. The policy environment along with institutional factors has not been 
favourable to manufactured exports. This means that the national business climate has not 
promoted a high level of competitiveness of the economy while many other factors raise 
transaction costs and inhibit manufactured exports. These factors have been variously analyzed 
in, for example, Dangote (2001), Obadan (1986b; 1993b), Osakwe (1987), Obi (1978). Among 
the constraining factors are the following: high cost of imported equipment, multiple levies and 
taxes, low production level occasioned by shortage of essential inputs, high production costs, 
(reflected by high cost of working capital, depreciation of the naira, corruption and inflation) 
which undermine international competitiveness. Others are institutional and infrastructural 
bottlenecks, poor quality of products, dumping of imported goods, and unpredictable government 
policies. Thus, as Obadan (2001d) has argued, under the circumstances, even an efficient 
manufacturing activity tends to have a low ratio of value added to product price.  
A third feature of Nigeria’s foreign trade relates to the direction of trade. The U.SA and 
European Community countries are the major buyers of Nigeria’s exports, although in recent 
years, Asian countries, particularly, India and Korea have become notable buyers of the 
country’s exports (oil). As at 2004, the Americas purchased 58.8 per cent of Nigeria’s oil exports 
while the USA alone bought 43.8 per cent of the exports. The countries that purchase Nigeria’s 
exports are also the major suppliers of her imports, particularly Western European countries. But, 
rather worrisome as Obadan (1996a, 1996b and 2007d) points out is the fact that Nigeria’s 
import and export trade with her neighbours – ECOWAS countries – and other African countries 
is relatively insignificant and unstable. The trade potentials with these countries would need to 
be explored in order to minimize the inherent problems in the traditional markets. This is 
particularly important as it is undesirable for a country to concentrate exports and imports in a 
few markets as it is unhealthy to concentrate on one commodity export – crude oil. 
Concentration on a few markets means that the country will experience instability in foreign 
exchange earnings when the economies of her few trading partners experience shocks, for 
example, depression or recession. The case for Nigeria to diversify her exports structure as well 
as markets is thus very strong. 
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instability of earnings from agricultural products and crude petroleum exports as a result of 
fluctuations in prices and volumes. In various studies, Obadan (1984, 1986a and 1988c) has 
provided significant insights into the sources and causes of instability in Nigeria’s foreign trade 
as well as the impact of the instability on the country’s economic development. In his 
comprehensive estimate of instability indices for all of Nigeria’s foreign exchange receipts and 
payments, Obadan (1984 and 1988c) found high degrees of instability in respect of a number of 
export items. Oil export receipts were found to be much more unstable than non-oil export 
earnings. Perhaps, because of the huge influence of oil exports, total merchandise export 
earnings also exhibited a high instability index.  
In one of the two studies (Obadan, 1984) is the notable finding that specialization in 
production and export of primary products is a major cause of instability in Nigeria’s export 
earnings. This is due mainly to concentration on petroleum whose earnings have been shown to 
have a high record of severe fluctuations. Instability of crude petroleum prices was also found to 
contribute significantly to fluctuations in total export proceeds. Another significant revelation 
was that the nature of export markets greatly increased instability in crude petroleum earnings. 
One major implication of export earnings instability is that it inhibits successful development 
planning. Indeed, the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981 – 1985, was completely derailed 
following the devastating negative shock experienced in the world oil market in 1981. In his 
further empirical work, Obadan (1986a) confirmed that export instability has deleterious effects 
on Nigeria’s economic development. Although a direct association of export instability with 
economic development showed a relatively weak relationship, further empirical evidence 
revealed that export instability strongly inhibits development indirectly. In this direction, export 
instability was found to be highly detrimental to the growth rate of investment as well as 
resulting in smaller proportions of national income being invested. The quantitative analysis also 
solidly supported the a priori claim that Nigeria’s economic growth and development is export-
led.  
The various studies threw up relevant policy implications, one of which is the need for a 
diversification programme to direct exports into relatively stable markets. A second is the 
mechanism of industrialization as a method of reducing instability in export earnings. Since 
empirical evidence indicates that manufactures generally have less volatile prices than primary 
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suggestive. This, of course, implies a proper tackling of the myriad of constraints on 
manufactured exports from Nigeria. Finally, also suggestive is the need for export stabilization 
schemes. And since crude oil exports constitute over 95 per cent of Nigeria’s export earnings, the 
studies support any efforts by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries to stabilize the 
quantity and prices of crude oil exports through the maintenance of production quotas and stable 
prices.  
 
5.3  Globalization and Foreign Capital Flows to Nigeria  
International capital flows is a major indicator of financial globalization. Against the 
background of financial and capital account liberalisation, the larger the share of a country’s 
capital flows in global capital flows the more financially globalized it is taken to be. As some 
authors including Obadan (2004d and 2004e) have observed, foreign capital inflows are usually 
perceived as a good thing and as an indicator of success, reflecting a record of prudent 
macroeconomic management. The potential benefits deriving from foreign capital, especially 
foreign direct investment (FDI), are seen as emanating from the inflow of foreign exchange, new 
technology, local value added, generation of employment, infusion of labour skills, contribution 
of taxes and royalties, and creation of external economies elsewhere in the economy, beyond the 
investment project itself. The free flow of capital is seen as something which enhances economic 
welfare as it channels savings to their most productive uses, boosts economic growth, reduces 
volatility of consumption and creates opportunities for portfolio diversification. But the free flow 
of capital also entails substantial risks/costs, one of which is financial crisis. A detailed analysis 
of these costs are in, for example, Obadan 1999a; 2004d, 2004e; Haque, Mathieson and Sharma, 
1997; Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003). It is in the light of these costs that the 
observation has been made to the effect that a flood of capital into economies with immature and 
poorly regulated financial institutions had tended to do more harm than good (Obadan, 2004e). 
Besides, more capital inflow may not automatically translate into higher growth. What is also 
needed in this regard are better government policies and stronger institutions if growth is to be 
achieved which will lead to a reduction of poverty and inequality.  
 
 
  81Nature and Features of  Capital Flows to Nigeria  
Apart from foreign financial aid, Nigeria has experienced three major types of capital 
inflow: foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and loans/debt flows.  
Portfolio Investment: This is a type of foreign investment which needs to be least preferred, and 
not encouraged, by a developing economy with weak institutions because of its feature of 
volatility. Some types of portfolio investment (in particular, the hot money variety such as short-
term bank loans) are very risky and can be reversed in a very short time. This is because foreign 
portfolio investors may suddenly decide to leave the country in which they are investing owing 
to factors that are not connected with problems in economic fundamentals but due to herd 
behaviour (Obadan, 1999 and 2004b). Such behaviour can cause financial crisis and recession. 
However, portfolio investment flows to Nigeria have, from my various analyses,  not been 
significant compared to foreign direct investment. The volume of portfolio investment in Nigeria 
has been quite low. Indeed, up to the mid – 1980s, Nigeria did not record portfolio investment in 
the balance of payments, perhaps, partly because of the non-disclosure of information on 
portfolio investment abroad by Nigerian investors. Available data show that in 1986, the balance 
of payments recorded net portfolio investment inflow of just N151.6 million. And between 1989 
and 1998 net portfolio investment inflow was negative, excepting 1992 (Table 5.9 and Fig. 14), 
invariably due to the absence of an enabling environment and non-internationalization of the 
capital market. However, from the 1990s, the Nigerian government took measures to promote the 
internationalization of the domestic money and capital markets. And since 1999, net portfolio 
investment inflow has been positive, rising up to N375,858.9 million in 2005. This positive trend 
is attributable not just to the internationalization of the capital market but also to the increased 
efforts of the government at investment promotion.  
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    (N million) 
 
Year     Net  Portfolio    Net  Direct   
                 Investment      Investment 
1986             151.6  735.8 
1986  151.6         735.8 
1987 4,353.1  2,452.8 
1988 2,611.8  1,718.2 
1989    -1,618.8    13,877.4 
1990       -435.2      4,686.0 
1991 -594.9  6,916.1 
1992 36,851.8  14,463.1 
1993 -377.0  29,660.3 
1994 -203.5  22,229.2 
1995    -5,785.0  75,940.6 
1996 -12,055.2  111,297.8 
1997    -4,780.5  110,456.2 
1998 -637.1  80,751.1 
1999     1,015.8    92,795.3 
2000 51,079.1  115,952.2 
2001 26,317.1  132,481.0 
2002 24,871.4  225,972.0 
2004 23,629.5  249,157.7 
2005 375,858.9  302,753.4 
2006 117,218.9  573,835.1 
Source:  CBN. Economic and Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 2, Dec. 1994, 2000; Annual 
Report, Dec. 2006. Statistical Bulletin, 2002. 
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Foreign Direct Investment: This is the most advantageous form of capital inflow, particularly 
in relation to debt flows. As Obadan (2004d and 2004e) has argued, in view of its clear benefits 
and advantages in relation to the other forms of capital inflow, FDI should be preferred and 
accorded priority in considerations of external finance. Not only does it bring money and 
machines but also technical know-how. It helps in industrialization, in building up economic 
overhead capital, and in creating larger employment opportunities. FDI has been found to be 
associated with a crowding-in of domestic investment and productivity growth. Besides, it poses 
lesser risk than external debt for the borrowing country. Indeed, FDI has the advantage that it is a 
non-debt-creating international flow as it does not add to a country’s contractual debt service 
obligations. And available empirical evidence supports the prevailing view that long-term capital 
flows, particularly FDI, are more stable than other flows. No doubt, in the light of these 
advantages, FDI does have a lot of attraction. But some benefits of FDI can become questionable 
and there are also various costs to the host country, which tend to offset the benefits and are of 
considerable concern. See for example, Obadan (1999a, 2004d, 2004e, 2007b), Khor (2001), 
IMF (1985), UNCTAD, (1997), etc. In the light of the costs, a crucial challenge, for policy 
makers is how to promote foreign investment inflow while minimizing costs.  
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foreign investments. Not only does the country have a large market, represented by a large and 
virile population, it is richly endowed with natural resources – mineral deposits, especially oil 
and gas, vegetation, arable agricultural land, etc. She also has cheap trained labour force. Yet, the 
country has not benefited much from foreign investment inflow. While net FDI flows to the 
developing countries as a whole have been increasing steadily since 1990, the relative share of 
the increasing flow attracted into the Nigerian economy maintained a low and declining level 
from 2.4 per cent in 1990 to 0.7 per cent in 2005. Obadan (2005e) and Central Bank of Nigeria 
(2001) explain the low level of FDI inflow in terms of numerous constraining factors, among 
which are macroeconomic instability and poor infrastructural facilities. Besides, Nigeria’s high 
external debt burden, until 2005, influenced adversely foreign investors’ perception of the health 
of the economy. Similarly, the incessant social and political instability, insecurity of life and 
property tended to undermine Nigeria’s efforts in attracting FDI. Thus, as Stern (2002) and 
World Bank, (2007) have stressed, open trade and investment policies will generate little or no 
benefits if other institutions and policies (embodied in the investment climate) are not in place or 
are bad. To Stern, “if you have an unreliable power supply, no financial depth, lots of harassment 
from government officials, a high level of corruption, and a very low skills base, then more open 
trade and investment policies, beneficial  though they are likely to be, are unlikely to generate 
increases in productive investment and employment”. This scenario fits the Nigerian situation 
which reflects low FDI inflow inspite of a huge internal market and largely open trade and 
investment regimes. Indeed, Obadan (1982), Anyanwu (1998) and Iyoha (2001) in their various 
quantitative analyses of the determinants of FDI inflows confirm the importance of domestic 
market size, among other factors, in determining FDI inflow into Nigeria. But the potential of 
this market has yet to  be fully realized. 
An analysis of the relatively low magnitude of FDI inflows reveals the following 
features. 
•  Net FDI flows (i.e., inflow minus outflow) has since 1970 generally been positive excepting 
1989 and 1990, rising from N121.6 million in 1970 to N41,470.8 million in 2006. The 
figures represent low percentages of 2.3 and 0.22 of GDP in 1970 and 2006, respectively.  
•  Cumulative FDI is concentrated in the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and processing, 
and trading and business services sectors. In the period, 1992 – 2006, mining and quarrying 
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manufacturing and processing (Fig. 15). However, the data indicate relative decline in the 
share of mining and quarrying in recent years in contrast to manufacturing shares. The 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, and other sectors have attracted very much less foreign 
investment. Agriculture has not been attractive to foreign capital, perhaps, because of its long 
gestation period, relatively low rates of return, low technology, etc. Thus, inspite of a large 
domestic market and government incentives, agriculture has continued to maintain the least 
share of FDI in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
•  And although in the last few years, FDI has trended upwards, particularly, in the services, 
real estate and telecommunication sectors, overall, capital inflows into Nigeria are still small 
in relation to GDP, and compared to many other developing and developed countries. Thus, 
as Obadan (2005a) has stressed, the response of FDI flows to the various incentives and 
promotion measures has not reached the level to warrant celebration. Therefore, a lot still 
needs to be done to attract a significant amount of strategic and productive investment to 
Nigeria. This requires improving the investment climate and addressing the problems and 
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desirable features of an alluring investment climate that government policy must focus upon. 
Among others, they include macroeconomic stability and consistent policies, transparent 
rules and regulations, political stability, a good investor orientation, adequate infrastructure, 
security of life and property, improved education and human capital development. 
Although capital inflows into a developing country may be beneficial under certain 
circumstances, serious problems arise when the return flows of interest, profits and dividends on 
the accumulated investments and repatriation of capital put pressure on the developing country’s 
balance of payments. Indeed, in his analysis of investment income remittances from Nigeria, 
Obadan (1978 and 1980b), observed that the position of dependency on foreign investment may 
create a situation where the real net export proceeds or real net import savings are low (or even 
negative) and grossly insufficient after allowing for remittances of profits, dividends, 
management fees, salaries of expatriate personnel, etc. Indeed, remittances may become so 
substantial relative to capital inflow that foreign direct investment ends up in net capital out-flow 
rather than inflow for a developing country. Under such circumstances, the benefit of foreign 
direct investment becomes dubious.  
In the case of Nigeria, available data show that direct investment income remittances 
were rather insignificant by the end of the 1950s, averaging N12.6 million in 1955 – 60, but had 
become quite substantial by the middle of the 1960s. As at 2004, the investment income 
remittances stood at N793,777.7 million and this was 40 times the net FDI inflow of N19,908.7 
million. The amount of remittances also stood at 17.2 per cent of exports or 35.2 per cent of 
external reserves. In general, the net inflow of investment funds has grown very much less than 
profit and dividends remittances. The ratios of direct investment income remittances to net 
investment inflow became staggering in the last decade being as high as 11,938.0 per cent in 
2000. Thus, the repatriation of direct investment income from Nigeria has been quite high both 
in absolute magnitude, and in relation to various economic indicators. In the light of the 
significant remittances, the contribution of FDI to economic development of Nigeria becomes 
significantly reduced below whatever it would have been. While foreign investment might have 
aided the growth of industrial production in the country, part of this growth has become illusory 
because of the liabilities of repatriated earnings (Obadan, 1980 and 2007d).  Thus, as I had 
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instances. It is that: 
foreign investment, it seems, far from being a means of developing 
underdeveloped countries, is a most efficient device for transferring wealth from 
poor to richer countries while at the same time enabling the richer to expand their 
control over the economies of the poorer.  
 
Thus, as Box 5.1 suggests, unless the host country is quite cautious foreign direct investment can 
be counter productive.  
 
Box 5.1: Implications of Direct Investment Income Remittances. 
  The analysis has shown that unless the host country is quite cautious direct foreign 
investment can be counter productive. Indeed, excessive dividend remittances vis-à-vis 
capital inflow may result in net outflow of funds from (rather than inflow into) a developing 
country. The case of Nigeria supports this. 
  Admittedly, direct foreign investment can be an important stimulus to economic 
growth and social development in developing countries as long as the interest of the foreign 
investors and host governments are congruent. But in many cases this is not so since many 
multinational corporations (MNCs) see their role in terms of global output or profit 
maximization with little interest in the long-run domestic impact of their activities. 
Consequently, it is important for developing countries to regulate the activities of MNCs to 
ensure their cooperation in the spheres of taxes, investment income remittances, 
reinvestment, non-political interference and the avoidance of bribery and corruption. 
Specifically, MNCs must make substantial reinvestments (although the long-run desirability 
of this is even in doubt) and conduct researches in the host countries rather than in their 
metropolitan capitals. Otherwise, developing countries may have to absorb substantial 
portions of the profits, by fiscal measures, for their economic development.  
 
Source: Obadan (1980b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4:  Foreign Capital Flows and Debt Accumulation 
One key fall-out of foreign capital flows is external debt which derives from foreign 
borrowing. This means that foreign borrowing creates external debt which must be paid. Also, it 
has to be managed in an efficient manner, otherwise a debt crisis ensues (Obadan, 2007e). But 
then, foreign borrowing arises because of the need to finance the excess of a country’s total 
expenditure over the national product. It allows a country to invest and consume beyond the 
limits of current domestic production and, in effect, finance capital formation not only by 
mobilizing domestic savings but also by tapping from capital surplus countries. If properly used, 
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growth. In the context of an open economy, as foreign borrowing is the excess of import of 
goods and services over export of goods and services, and net borrowing creates debt that can be 
repaid if exports exceed imports, there will be no debt problem if export earnings grow rapidly 
and provide the foreign exchange to service the debt. Thus, as Obadan (2004d and 2004e) has 
stressed,  
“a country that relies on foreign borrowing should be able to generate sufficient increase 
in output and, in particular, export earnings, to be able to meet its debt obligations and, 
hence, avoid falling into a debt trap. In as much as foreign loans are desirable, a country 
must avoid indiscriminate and uncontrolled borrowing as this not only negates a 
country’s self reliance policy objective but also increases its dependence on external 
creditors with their attendant stranglehold on the debtor country’s economy particularly 
through the role of some international financial institutions whose actions portray them as 
debt collectors for western creditors”. 
 
The analysis of various aspects of Nigeria’s debt management by Obadan (1988a, 1992a 
1999a; 2002a; 2003d; 2004d; 2004e) provided deep insights into the country’s debt features and 
problems. Capital flows to Nigeria has tended to be accompanied by serious debt problems, 
particularly against the background of very weak and defective management of the external debt. 
The situation has been such that until 2005 when the country secured substantial debt relief from 
her creditors, Nigeria was one of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), although not 
officially so classified for the purpose of benefiting from the HIPC debt relief imitative. The 
country borrowed heavily in the past but mismanaged or diverted the loans in the service of 
corruption, thus resulting in an external debt crisis and a debilitating debt burden. The external 
debt stock which was less than one billion US dollars in 1976 grew in leaps and bounds and 
became very large in absolute magnitudes from 1977 onwards with the contracting of US$ 1.0 
billion ‘jumbo loan’ from the international capital markets in 1978. Many loans were contracted 
thereafter and the debt stock stood at US$ 18.9 billion and US$ 33.4 billion in 1985 and 1991, 
respectively. As at 2004, the external debt stock was US$ 35.9 billion, or US$ 276.4 per capita. 
It reduced to only US$ 3.5 billion in 2006 because of the cancellation of the Paris Club debt in 
that year. Fig. 16 and Table 5.10  show the structure of the external debt before and after the debt 
relief.  
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Figure 16:  Structure of Nigeria's External Debt 
( Per  cent) 
(a): 2004 - Before the Debt Relief
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Corresponding to the fast growth in the debt stock was the phenomenon of huge debt 
service payments on which the country fell into huge arrears because of foreign exchange 
constraint and unproductive loans. Nigeria made cumulative debt service payments of about US$ 
37.0 billion to all creditors between 1985 and 2004 (CBN Annual Report, 2005). Yet, the debt 
remained unsustainable and the phenomenon of capitalizing accrued arrears on deferred 
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payments had tended to drain the nation’s resources and reduce the possible expenditure of 
resources on productive ventures. Emphasizing the implications of huge debt service payments 
for economic growth, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria at a seminar in October, 1997, 
warned “that the heavy debt burden that the country is experiencing has reduced investible funds 
that could have aided the development process. The increasing net transfer of resources from 
Nigeria is compromising the objective of economic restructuring 
The inefficient management of Nigeria’s external debt has reflected in the following 
features (Obadan, 2002a; 2003d; 2004d; 2004e): 
 
 
Table 5.10: Structure of Nigeria’s External Debt, 2004 and 2006 
2004 (Before the Debt Relief) 
Paris  Club    -  US$30.85  bn  (85%) 
Multilateral Institutions - US$2.82  bn  (7.9%) 
London  Club    -  US$1.44  bn  (4.0%) 
Promissory Note Holders   -  US$0.78 bn  (2.2%) 
Others       -  US$0.048  bn  (0.1%) 
 
2006 (After the Debt Relief) 
Paris  Club    -  US$0.0  bn  (0%) 
Multilateral Institutions - US$2.608  bn  (73.5%) 
London  Club    -  US$0.0  bn  (0%) 
Promissory Note Holders   -  US$0.509 bn  (14.4%) 
Others       -  US$0.427  bn  (12.1%) 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. Annual Report, 2005 and 2006 
 
•  excessive borrowing of medium-term high cost funds in relation to profitability and export 
earnings;   
•  inappropriate borrowing terms, reflecting variable and rising interest rates and shorter 
maturities as well as accumulation of arrears in the mid 1980s; 
•  inappropriate debt maturity profile, resulting in bunching of repayments; 
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•  continued increase in the debt stock even when no new fresh loans are contracted; and 
•  very importantly, mismanagement of borrowed funds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.2: Findings on Nigerian Government Projects Financed with External Loans 
i.  Eighteen projects, described as “failed projects”, financed with credits and loans 
amounting to $836.17 million were never executed; the projects never had sites, and 
where they did, they were never cleared; and there was nothing on ground. Yet, the 
loans have been drawn down and are being serviced by government; 
 
ii.  Forty-three projects, categorized as “distressed” financed with loans amounting to 
$4,446.0 million, were implemented in most cases up to the stage of commissioning, but 
were either not commissioned or where they were commissioned, they had to close 
down soon after; and  
 
iii.  Eighty-four projects, financed with loans amounting to $8,438.8 million, were surviving 
and operating at some capacity level during the appraisal. The bulk of them are 
irrigation and water supply projects.  
 
Source: Federal Government Budget Statement, 1997; Obadan (2004d) 
 
The issue of poor use or mismanagement of borrowed funds has been a worrisome aspect 
of Nigeria’s debt management. Most of the loans which were procured from private sources with 
unfavourable terms were either diverted or spent on projects which were unable to generate 
funds to service the underlying debt. The Federal Government, through the 1996 budget, 
acknowledged that many of the projects financed by external loans were either uncompleted or 
partially completed, and where they had been completed, they were not functioning. Box 5.2 
shows the highlights of findings of an appraisal by the Federal Ministry of Finance of 145 
projects executed in 30 states of the federation and Abuja. In his analysis of the implications of 
the findings, Obadan (2004d and 2004e) noted that over 40 per cent of the sampled projects were 
not yielding any economic and social benefits at all. Even those that survived barely yielded any 
meaningful economic and social benefits. All expectations from the projects relating to their 
contribution to government revenue, labour employment, and overall growth and development of 
the economy, have not materialized.  
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burdensome for the economy and debt servicing became problematic, particularly in the face of 
ineffective debt management strategies such as debt restructuring entailing financing of trade 
arrears, debt buy-back, debt conversion programme and debt rescheduling. The latter was 
particularly popular with the past governments and four debt rescheduling exercises were 
undertaken between 1986 and 2000. But as Obadan (2004e) has argued, the reliefs obtained from 
the reschedulings were temporary and inadequate, considering that the effective maturity dates of 
debts were merely postponed by the exercises; the rescheduling also entailed various costs, such 
as imposing higher commitment charges, hindering development in the long-run, building up 
obligations for the future, and creating problems for posterity and future governments (Obadan, 
1988a). After four rounds of rescheduling exercises, effective debt stock reduction did not 
happen and the burden of debt was becoming unbearable.
9  
In view of the inherent weaknesses of the traditional debt relief mechanisms, particularly, 
the debt rescheduling strategy, I had argued that it must be jettisoned in favour of debt-reducing 
mechanisms entailing debt cancellation or debt forgiveness. The need for a significant reduction 
in the debt burden through debt cancellation was very compelling. In my book, Foreign Capital 
Flows and External Debt (Obadan, 2004e), I made a strong case for debt cancellation for Nigeria, 
long before the country obtained significant debt relief in 2005. The book argued for an 
International Development Association (IDA) – only treatment for Nigeria which would enable 
her debts to be cancelled or substantially reduced so that the country can flexibly use the free 
debt servicing funds to meet the urgent challenges of poverty reduction, social and economic 
development that it (country) faces. If Nigeria were to have an IDA – only status, of the type 
accorded Bosnia and Yugoslavia (countries with much higher per capita income than Nigeria), it 
could immediately be entitled to a cancellation of 67 per cent of the debt stock at the decision 
point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Relief Initiative.  The specific 
arguments that I had advanced for the international creditor community to cancel Nigeria’s debt 
included the following: 
                                                 
9 Stressing the burden of debt on the Nigerian economy, former president Olusegun Obasanjo stated as follows, “in 
1999, we inherited a debt portfolio that had us servicing at levels which tripled our education budget. This was 
unacceptable to me as we were not even touching the principal amount”. In: forward to The Story of Overview of 
Public Expenditure in NEEDS. (Abuja: The Presidency, Government of Nigeria). 
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per capita income, low export earnings per capita, high incidence of poverty, heavy debt 
burden, no borrowing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) since 1993, etc. The IMF (2002) even acknowledged that Nigeria has the income and 
credit worthiness characteristics of an IDA – only country (GNP of $260 in 2000 and no 
market access); 
•  Unsustainable external debt profile. Debt sustainability analysis suggested unsustainable debt 
profile without debt relief.  
•  Nigeria has economic and social indicators similar to many other HIPCs. For example, the 
average per capita income of the first 22 HIPCs approved for debt reduction is $390.0 per 
annum compared to about $260.0 for Nigeria. In the sphere of social needs, burden of 
disease, urgency of a poverty and social strategy, Nigeria is exactly where the other HIPCs 
are. Thus, Nigeria’s status is comparable to the other HIPCs. 
•  Owing to the draconian terms under which most of the loans were taken in the first place, 
Nigeria had more than paid what she ought to pay. The records show that up to a point, 
Nigeria borrowed about $12.0 billion from the Paris Club of official creditors; she had since 
paid a total of over $17.0 billion debt service, yet she owed over $21.0 billion to members of 
the club. Thus, with the above arguments, a firm basis was laid for the debt relief obtained by 
the country in 2005.  
Under the External Debt Relief Deal obtained from the Paris Club in June, 2005, the 
Paris Club granted Nigeria an IDA - only status which was an acknowledgement of the merit in 
the debt relief arguments. An agreement was reached to cancel 60 per cent ($18.0 billion) of 
Nigeria’s debt of $30,847,814,530.0 with the Paris Club. On its part, Nigeria was to pay a total 
of $12.4 billion to the Paris Club to completely exit from the debt owed to the Club. This amount 
has been paid. Accordingly, as at December 2006, Nigeria had completely exited the Paris Club 
debt and owed no debt to the Club (Table 5.10). In the light of this, Nigeria must strive to avoid 
being enmeshed in another round of debt crisis in the future. She must imbibe the principles of 
sound debt management which requires that external loans be invested in export-increasing 
activities or import-reducing activities. In general, if foreign loans are desirable and necessary to 
accelerate economic development, they must be channeled in such a way as to increase the 
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growth (Obadan, 2004d). 
5.5:  Globalization, Growth and Development  
One prevailing view in the economics literature is that globalization, through the 
channels of openness, trade and investment, has a positive and significant relationship with the 
rate of economic growth. Indeed, some view globalization as holding the key to rapid economic 
growth (Uwatt, 2004). Yet, the empirical evidence has not produced an unambiguous 
globalization – growth link. Dollar and Kraay (2001), in their study of the experiences of a group 
of developing countries that have significantly opened up to international trade during the 
previous two decades report evidence which suggest that increased trade has strongly encouraged 
growth and poverty reduction and has contributed to narrowing gaps between the rich and poor 
world-wide. Some empirical evidence on African countries have indicated a positive association 
between growth of income and growth of exports (Soderbom and Teal, 2003; Iyoha, 2002). But 
Uwatt’s empirical evidence on 41 African countries, using panel data, indicate mixed results that 
are sensitive to the estimation method (Uwatt, 2004). The mixed results tended to lean more on 
the side of lack of significant effect of trade openness on growth. Similarly, financial openness 
(measured by net capital flow /GDP ratio) had negative effect on growth.  
The empirical studies on Nigeria have similarly produced mixed results on the 
relationship between trade openness and growth. Allege (2004) concluded that openness to trade 
and increased information and communications technology have significantly influenced the 
level of manufacturing output in Nigeria, based on one of the four equations estimated; the other 
three showed openness as having a negative effect on growth. But foreign direct investment 
tended to have a positive but insignificant effect. In their empirical investigation of the dynamic 
influence of trade openness and other factors on economic growth in Nigeria, Ndiyo and Ebong 
(2004) found a negative influence of openness on economic growth. But foreign direct 
investment exerted a positive impact on growth. The empirical investigation by Obadan (2005d) 
of the relationship between trade openness and growth on the one hand, and trade openness and 
development on the other, tended to confirm Uwatt’s results. For example, he found openness to 
have an inverse and depressing impact on the GDP and on development, represented by per 
capita income. Gross domestic investment was found to be the major determinant of changes in 
per capita GDP and GDP. Human capital development also significantly affected the GDP but 
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be positively related to   gross domestic investment, the association was not statistically 
significant. Gross national saving exerted the major influence on domestic investment. Perhaps, 
the negative effect of openness on growth can be explained in line with Matin’s (1992) 
observation that the new growth literature does not predict that greater openness will 
unambiguously raise the growth rate of national output. Rather, growth can be lowered by 
increased foreign competition or it can be increased by import protection. The mixed findings 
can thus, perhaps, be explained. And they suggest limited benefits from globalization.  
It is not in doubt that globalization has had some positive effects on the Nigerian 
economy, for example, through its impact on the oil sector. But many authors, e.g, Agbu (2004), 
Owolabi (1988), Obadan (2001d) are also agreed that considering various macroeconomic and 
social indicators, globalization has not conferred much benefits on the Nigerian economy in 
relation to the experiences of some other developing countries in East Asia and Latin America. 
For example, as was noted before, export-oriented growth in the context of globalization, was an 
important part of the strategy that made dramatic inroads into income poverty in East Asia. But 
the same cannot be said of Nigeria. Until recently, as Obadan (2001d) has shown, while 
Nigeria’s export earnings showed poor performance over time, those of other countries like 
Mexico, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and the Phillipines 
improved dramatically. In 1980, among these countries, Nigeria had the highest export earnings 
of US$25.9 billion. But by 1997 / 98, the export earnings of the countries dramatically surpassed 
those of Nigeria thus, Nigeria ($9.0 bn); Mexico ($117.5 bn); South Korea ($138.6 bn); 
Singapore ($110.4 bn); Hong Kong ($174.0 bn); Malaysia ($77.9 bn); and the Phillipines ($29.4 
bn). With the sharp declines in Nigeria’s export earnings, its capacity to improve the standards of 
living of the citizens, through a higher level of import of goods and services, eroded 
immeasurably. In the last five years, however, owing to the persistently rising crude oil prices in 
the global market, growth has resumed in export earnings, such that the 1980 export earnings 
mark was achieved in 2002 and an upward trend has been maintained, with export earnings 
peaking at $66.4 billion in 2006. However, while the other countries increasingly diversified 
their economies into more manufactured exports, Nigeria’s economy became more and more 
concentrated on a single product – crude oil – whose price in the world market has been very 
unstable.  
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performance was disappointing, averaging less than 3.0 per cent per annum over the period, 1960 
– 2003. (Nigeria: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 
2004). The average growth rate of 6.4 per cent in 2004 and 2005 was still relatively low in 
relation to the exigencies of poverty reduction. With a per capita income of about US$560.0 in 
2005, Nigeria ranked among the low income and severely indebted countries in the world as at 
that time. The incidence of poverty, by official accounts, reduced from 65.6 per cent in 1996 to 
54.4 per cent in 2004, an average rate of 1.2 per cent per year. At this rate, Nigeria will not be 
able to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015. Other social 
indicators do not portray a better picture. Life expectancy at birth has dropped from 54 years to 
46 years while adult literacy rate stood at 57 per cent in 2005. As at 2000, barely 50 per cent of 
the population had access to safe drinking water while 40 per cent had access to electricity, 
which indeed had been epileptic for those that had access. In human development terms, the 
UNDP’s human development index ranks Nigeria very low, placing the country among the 
lowest human development countries. One of the fall-outs of globalization on the Nigerian 
economy was external debt burden, which eased only from 2005. But before then, it had done a 
lot of damage to the economy. Empirical analyses of the impact of external debt on Nigeria’s 
economic growth have found support for the negative effect of debt overhang. In this direction, 
Nigeria’s external debt stock and debt service payments acted to depress investment and lower 
the rate of economic growth through both the debt overhang effect and “crowding out” effect 
(Iyoha, 1997).  
An important question, that I have I tried to answer, relates to why Nigeria has tended to 
reap poor dividends from globalization. A view that I expressed sometime ago (Obadan, 2001d), 
is that the problems of poor governance and gross mismanagement, reflecting a brazen predation 
of national resources by those entrusted with their care, have, no doubt, been significant factors. 
What with Nigeria’s ranking for a long time, by Transparency International (IT), as one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world, such that even the limited earnings through globalization 
have been squandered through corruption which has become grand and systemic. Nevertheless, 
the monocultural nature of Nigeria’s economy and the fact of its structural dependence on 
primary commodity production and exports have been strong factors in the country’s limited 
benefits from globalization. The structural dependence also stretches to heavy importation of 
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face of counter-balancing macroeconomic policies. Yet, manufactured exports provide a 
veritable means of measuring a country’s modernization and its competitiveness in international 
trade as well as its beneficial participation in the globalization process. Although Soderbom and 
Teal (2003) have reported lack of evidence that manufactured exports have a stronger effect on 
income than other exports, the overwhelming empirical evidence is that the developing countries 
that have succeeded most in boosting exports and growth, and achieved significant poverty 
reduction are those that have successfully shifted to manufactured goods export. The World 
Bank (2005) reports the cases of China, India and Mexico which, as they opened up, shifted into 
manufactured products so that, as at today, they are competing head-to-head with many of the 
rich countries,. Indeed, in 1980, manufactured products comprised only 25 per cent of 
developing countries’ exports, but by 1998, that figure had risen to more than 80 per cent. 
Nigeria is certainly not one of these countries.  
 
6.  APPROPRIATE   POLICY RESPONSES AND LESSONS 
If globalization has not yielded much benefits to the poor African countries, should they 
turn their back on it? As I have argued in the past, the answer is ‘no’, as this is not a desirable 
response because countries unwilling to engage with other nations  of the world risk falling 
further behind the rest of the world in terms of both income and human development. The 
powerful forces of globalization have resulted in the shrinkage of space, time and national 
borders, thus creating a global village. Furthermore, we already live in a global economy where 
flows of trade, capital and knowledge across national borders are not only large but also 
increasing every year. Thus, autarky is not a viable option. Therefore, under the present 
circumstances, a strengthening of the policy and institutional environment in SSA, Nigeria 
included, is required to improve the region’s competitiveness, accelerate its integration into the 
world economy, promote rapid economic growth and make a remarkable dent on poverty 
(Obadan, 2001a; 2001b; 2001d). Sound policies play a key role in determining the extent to 
which countries can draw from the benefits of global economic integration for economic growth. 
And if African countries have to achieve the International Development Targets set for 2015, 
especially the target of halving extreme poverty and significantly improving social conditions, 
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a sustained basis. 
To the above end, however, there is the pressing need for each country to design 
economic strategies and policies that recognize and respect its specific needs and circumstances, 
and to promote sustainable and inclusive economic and social development that spreads its 
benefits to all sections of the society. As the UNDP (1999) has correctly observed: “economic 
policy making should be guided by pragmatism rather than ideology and recognition that what 
works in Chile does not necessarily work in Argentina, what is right for Mauritius may not work 
for Madagascar. Open markets require institutions to function, and policies to ensure equitable 
distribution of benefits and opportunities. And with the great diversity of institutions and 
traditions, countries around the world need flexibility in adapting economic policies and timing 
their implementation”. The need for each country to design an appropriate response based on its 
political and economic realities suggests that SSA countries should be wary of pressures from 
notable international stakeholders, namely, transnational corporations, international banks and 
financial intermediaries, and multilateral international financial institutions, in the direction of an 
all encompassing process of globalization. Mauritius has already set a notable example in this 
regard. Inspite of defying the “Washington consensus” through heavy intervention and targeting 
in trade, including the creation of export processing zones, Mauritius has made remarkable 
economic and social progress since the early 1970s (IMF Survey, 2001: 169). It, however, 
strived to put in place stable macroeconomic policies, neutral incentives between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors, and an efficient services sector. Nevertheless, it is important for African 
countries to be prepared to face the challenges of globalization by putting their houses in order, 
and transforming and revitalizing their ailing economies with policies relating to sensible 
liberalisation in the context of outward-oriented growth, complementary macro and 
microeconomic policies, promotion of manufactured exports, regional integration, human capital 
development, promotion of strategic foreign direct investment inflow, raising the level of 
domestic saving and investment, development of technology, infrastructure, among others. In 
other words, a number of basic things must be put right for globalization to yield significant 
benefits to poor countries, Nigeria included.  
In the specific case of Nigeria, the economy is relatively open and the country is rich in 
natural, human and other resources. Yet, she is one of the countries that are yet to experience 
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indicators, and even with what appears to be huge oil earnings.
10 This notwithstanding, the issue 
at this point in time is not whether or not Nigeria should join forces with globalization. For as I 
had argued in the past (Obadan, 2001d and 2002b) and as Agbu (2004) has also stressed, no 
country is an island unto itself. Therefore, at the present moment of integration of global 
markets, but considering the nature of Nigeria’s post-colonial economy, the country has little 
choice but to participate in the globalization activities with the aim of benefiting commensurably. 
Autarky is thus ruled out. As I had observed sometime ago (Obadan, 2004d), China that tended 
towards autarky in the past, on ideological grounds, is now an active player in the globalization 
process. Today, China is the largest developing country recipient of foreign direct investment 
and it has exemplary high level economic performance – a growth rate of over 8.0 per cent 
annum – to show for it. Thus, for Nigeria, the issue should be how best to take advantage of the 
benefits of globalization, avoid the risk of being marginalized by the forces of globalization, 
raise economic growth rates significantly, improve competitiveness in terms of the efficiency of 
its production, the quality of resources available for exchange, as well as substantially reduce the 
incidence of poverty. Meeting this challenge requires designing and implementing sound 
economic policies and activities aimed at transforming the economy from a resource-based 
economy to an industrial and knowledge-based one so as to turn globalization into a positive 
development for the country. In other words, good policies are required to meet the challenge of 
turning globalization into an instrument of opportunity and inclusion. In this direction, the 
lessons for Nigeria as well as the strategies and policies for enhancing the country’s beneficial 
participation in the global economy are highlighted as follows as reflected in Obadan (1996a; 
1996b; 1999a; 2001a; 2001b; 2001d; 2003a; Obadan and Obioma, (1999). 
(i)  Orderly Implementation of Outward-oriented Strategy 
Outward-oriented strategy is an industrialization and trade strategy which encourages 
production for exports and thereby creates greater profitability. However, if the export sector is 
to be a propelling force in development, it is important that it should not remain an enclave, 
separate from the rest of the economy, as is the case in Nigeria. Furthermore, although openness 
is a necessary - though not a sufficient - condition for national prosperity, countries that are best 
placed to benefit from the opportunities offered by globalization are those that are rapidly 
                                                 
10 Nigeria’s huge oil export earnings amounted to only US$  312.8 per capita in 2006.  
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Outward-oriented polices brought great dynamism and greater prosperity to much of East Asia, 
transforming it from one of the poorest areas of the world 40 years ago. It must be cautioned, 
however, that openness and liberalized trade regimes have to be achieved in an orderly and 
properly sequenced manner, taking cognizance of necessary pre-conditions.  
(ii)  Complementary Macro and Microeconomic Policies  
As globalization increases the cost of macroeconomic distortions while enhancing the 
reward for good policies, it is necessary to have in place sound macroeconomic, sectoral and 
structural policies in order to improve macroeconomic stability, ensure external sector viability, 
make the economies more flexible, encourage diversification, reduce the vulnerability to external 
shocks, ensure stable and development-oriented exchange and interest rates, and increase the 
overall economic growth rate. Such policies will include prudent fiscal policy to ensure 
macroeconomic stability and provide a basis for effective and efficient monetary policy. 
Macroeconomic stability, by reducing uncertainty, allows investment and savings decisions 
consistent with underlying economic fundamentals, thereby promoting an efficient allocation of 
resources. Further reforms are needed in the areas of public enterprise activity, the labour 
markets, trade regime and banking supervision and regulation.   
(iii)  Promotion of Manufactured Exports 
Dependence on primary commodity exports has not significantly aided Nigeria’s 
integration into the global economy nor minimized its marginalization, even though the economy 
is open. The development of Nigeria’s economy will therefore require a major commitment to 
policies and institutions that promote manufactured exports in areas of comparative advantage, 
as well as focus on the recovery of the real sector of the economy. Historical experience shows 
that most of the countries that have emerged as successful export promoters and acquired the 
status of newly industrializing countries, have promoted manufactured exports. Among Nigerian 
analysts, e.g. Obadan (1994a and 2001a); Central Bank of Nigeria (1997)); Fafowora (1998); 
Odedokun (2000) there seems to be a consensus that Nigeria’s economic development, and 
hence growth potential, will depend on her ability to export manufactured goods as against the 
primary products it is known for. Therefore, the country’s policies will have to focus on making 
manufacturing internationally competitive. Locally manufactured products are not competitive at 
home and abroad for various reasons already noted. Desirable measures in this regard must 
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infrastructural deficiencies – electricity, water supply, fuel supply, transportation and 
telecommunication networks, high lending rates, etc. Under the present high interest rate regime 
not much genuine manufacturing is taking place. On their part, Nigerian manufacturers must 
produce to international standards in terms of product quality, presentation and packaging to 
assure competitiveness. Improvement in the quality of manufacturing can be achieved through 
heavy investment in research and development, and the attraction of strategic foreign direct 
investment.  
(iv)  Human Capital Development  
Human capital development is critical for the survival of Nigeria and other poor countries 
in the context of globalization and increasingly ‘knowledge-based’ economies. The significance 
of the human factor becomes prominent when it is realized that machines can only work, but 
they cannot think like human beings, or solve the problems of organisation and production 
(Fafowora, 1998). There is, therefore, the need to invest heavily in human capital, especially 
education and health. To succeed in the new global economy, the country needs healthy and 
well-educated and skilled people, and greater access to knowledge, ideas and new information 
and communication technologies. The rate of skills growth is a key factor in determining the 
extent to which the country can capture a growing share of trade by increasing manufactured and 
service exports.  Skill levels will need to rise, underpinned by enhanced investment in basic 
education, so that Nigeria can develop a comparative advantage in the fast growing sectors of 
world trade. Moreover, as the new technologies are knowledge and skill-intensive, there is the 
need to train people to work with those technologies. Investment in education should be geared 
towards increasing access for more people and enhancing quality. Adequate consideration must 
also be given to research and development, as basis for the advancement of the frontiers of 
knowledge required for growth.  
(v)  Adequate Infrastructure 
One of the inhibiting factors to industrial development and manufactured exports in the 
country is infrastructure failings. Locally manufactured products are not competitive at home and 
abroad for various reasons, a notable one of which is high cost of production, occasioned by the 
parlous state of infrastructure facilities in the country. As the Manufacturer’s Association of 
Nigeria (M.A.N) has correctly observed, not only is infrastructure basic to the functioning of an 
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markets (MAN, 1999). Policy must, therefore, continue to focus on adequate provision and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure – electricity, fuel supply, water supply, transportation, 
telecommunication, etc – as a critical element of an enabling environment for private sector-led 
growth. So far, inspite of the top-most priority given to infrastructure development in the Federal 
Government annual budget over the past nine years, mismanagement and corruption have 
continued to rob the country of reliable and efficient infrastructure. 
(vi)  Appropriate Role for the State and Private Sector 
For a long time, the strategy of public sector-led development held sway in most African 
countries, Nigeria included. In the current era of globalization with its logic of market-
orientation, there is no room for the dominance of the state in directly productive activities, 
except in areas of market failure and where government serves as a catalyst. Rather, private 
sector-led growth has to be encouraged while the state provides an enabling environment for the 
private sector to fulfil its role. Nevertheless, a strong state is needed to cushion the impact of the 
market and globalization. It will also actively support and help to create a positive environment 
for the development and renewal of entrepreneurship as well as promote labour-intensive 
manufacturing as was done by the NICs in the past. But then, the private sector needs to exhibit 
the type of dynamism and virility required for meaningful participation in the globalization 
process. Finally, there is need for a strong public-private partnership. This type of partnership 
helped Japanese businesses to dominate the world markets within a relatively short period of 
time. Moreover, western businesses have used the partnership model, in terms of working closely 
with their governments, to win contracts and buy foreign assets in the developing world, 
particularly in the context of deregulation and privatisation of industries (Kiggundu, 2002). 
(vii)  Pragmatic Financial Liberalisation.   
Financial sector and capital account liberalisation are an important feature of 
globalization. This has, however, often been done in a misguided manner by some developing 
countries, resulting in the globalization by - product of bank failures and financial crises. These 
have serious and potentially far-reaching consequences for the local economy, as well as for the 
social and political governance of the country in terms of political instability. There is therefore 
the need for caution and proper sequencing of capital account liberalisation. Besides, such 
liberalisation must meet the pre-requisites of macroeconomic stability, adequate prudential 
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practices in financial and corporate sectors, and avoidance of implicit government guarantees 
that encourage excessive, unsustainable capital inflows. Even then, capital account liberalisation 
has to be done in a sensible manner to reflect appropriate timing, speed, scope and sequencing. 
Therefore, a lot needs to be done to create secure and enabling economic environments, without 
which domestic and foreign investors will continue to shy away from many profitable business 
opportunities that the country offers. Such an environment requires ensuring the following: 
macroeconomic stability and consistent policies, transparent rules and regulations, political 
stability, an effective and efficient public administration, good governance (characterized by 
absence of corruption), security of life an property, absence of civil strifes, and adequate 
infrastructure (Obadan, 2004e).  
(viii)  Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
Capital flows which are a prominent feature in the globalization process can be quite 
beneficial to a country’s growth and development. But they also have their own risks/costs, 
particularly the short-term portfolio flows. Therefore, policy must encourage and attract long-
term capital inflows, particularly FDI. Even then, Nigeria must determine the appropriate level of 
foreign participation in particular sectors and design an appropriate set of policies not only to 
attract FDI, but also to significantly increase the benefits of FDI in relation to the costs. It is 
important to know that undue reliance on FDI is not advisable and that not all FDI is conducive 
to development. Some kinds of FDI do more harm than good. Nigeria’s investment climate until 
the late 1990s was very unattractive. Even now, some investors still see the country as a 
relatively high-risk country for foreign investment, with the features of high transaction costs, 
bureaucratic inefficiencies (e.g, at the ports), skills shortage, high level of corruption and 
insecurity. 
(ix)  Raising the Level of Domestic Investment 
If Nigeria must realize growth rates that will enable it to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015,
11 and participate meaningfully in the globalization 
process, then domestic investment rates must be raised substantially beyond what they currently 
                                                 
11 The Millennium Development Goals are a series of eight time-bound goals agreed to by world leaders in 2000 and 
to be achieved by 2015. The goals aim at eradicating poverty and extreme hunger; achieving universal primary 
education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; 
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability and developing global 
partnership for development.  
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below the minimum rate of about 30 per cent of GDP required to unleash poverty – reducing 
growth. And so, the current situation requires raising domestic saving rates and mobilizing 
private capital. Domestic savings can be increased by pursuing macroeconomic stability through 
prudent fiscal policies, monetary policies that encourage positive real rates of interest, 
appropriate exchange and interest rates, and reforms of the domestic financial sectors particularly 
the capital market. Policies that promote compulsory savings schemes such as mandatory 
provident fund contributions will also be helpful. On the other hand, besides raising domestic 
savings, investment can be boosted by measures to improve the investment climate to reflect 
confidence in the economy and its management, and consistent policies, among others (Obadan 
and Odusola, 2001c). 
(x)  Continued Reform of the Domestic Financial Sector 
The financial system, particularly the banking sector and capital markets, play a critical 
role in lubricating a country’s wheels for beneficial participation in the dynamics of 
globalization. This is particularly so in relation to international private capital flows which are a 
key driving force in the globalization process. But then, the financial sector must be adequately 
prepared to withstand the stresses arising from volatile capital flows. A flood of capital into 
economies with immature and poorly regulated financial institutions had tended to do more harm 
than good. In this regard, it would be recalled that fragile and corrupt banking systems in an 
environment of weak prudential regulations significantly aided the ramifications of the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 – 98. Therefore, in order to avoid financial crisis, distress and 
recession, the banking system and other segments of the financial system must be strengthened 
through adequate supervisory and prudential regulations. In this way internationalization may not 
disrupt the financial sector, precipitate macroeconomic instability and weaken the productive 
sectors of the economy (Obaseki, 1999: 16). The reform of the financial sector should ensure, 
among others, that there are prudential rules and measures to guide the institutionalization of 
sound banking behaviour and reduction of the moral hazard associated with fraudulent banking 
culture.  
(xi)  Development of Technology 
One of the notable driving forces of globalization is cumulative developments and 
improvements in information, transport and telecommunications technology. Indeed, 
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“arteries” of the global economy. For Nigeria to benefit meaningfully from globalization, she 
must overcome the present situation of low level technological development. The country must 
pay serious attention to adaptation and adoption of technologies that can enhance the 
competitiveness of the economy. To enhance export development and diversification, not only 
should emphasis be on the development of the transportation, education, telecommunication 
sectors, as well as heavy investment in research and development, science and technology, but 
also that the vigorous acquisition of technology should become a national policy.  
(xii)  Addressing the Problems of Governance and Civil Strife 
For Nigeria to take full advantage of the benefits of globalization and minimize its risks, 
improved policies and highly strengthened institutions are crucial. But these need to be 
complemented by good governance in terms of establishing greater transparency and 
accountability in public and private sectors, as well as tackling corruption and inefficiency in the 
management of public affairs. Besides, the need to put an end to civil strife in the country cannot 
be overemphasized, for as Ouattara (1998: 4), has correctly observed “even if the right economic 
policies are implemented, no progress will be possible if armed conflicts persist”. Therefore, the 
country needs to focus its efforts on resolving ongoing disputes and devising effective 
mechanisms of conflict resolution, particularly, in the Niger Delta Region  
(xiii)  Operation within Regional Integration 
Developing and operating within the framework of regional and sub-regional economic 
groupings is one desirable response to the powerful force of globalization. Greater intra-regional 
trade will promote the export competitiveness of participating countries and enhance their ability 
to compete on international markets. In view of the small size of many African economies, the 
approach of regional integration will enable them to establish joint large-scale efficient and 
competitive enterprises, and hence enable producers to realize economies of scale and benefit 
from the establishment of regional infrastructures. And as Ouattara (1996: 2) had observed, “a 
regional approach in key structural areas – such as tariff reduction and harmonization, legal, and 
regulatory reform, payments system rationalization, financial sector reorganization, investment 
incentives and tax system harmonization, and labour market reform – enables participating 
countries to pool their resources and avail themselves of regional and institutional and human 
resources, in order to attain a level of technical and administrative competence that would not be 
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integration matters. But then, Nigeria and other African countries must overcome the perennial 
problem of lack of political will to integrate and implement community decisions (Obadan, 
1994c; 2001b and 2001d). 
 
(xiv)  Complementary Role of the Industrial Countries 
 Nigeria and many other African countries have been moving along the path of openness 
economically and they are striving to make progress on the path of enhancing their integration 
into the world economy. But they continue to confront protectionism in the rich countries. These 
countries maintain barriers in exactly the areas where the poor countries have comparative 
advantage: agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing such as textiles, leather products, etc. 
According to the World Bank (2005), protection in the rich countries cost developing countries 
more than US$100.0 billion per year, twice the total volume of trade from the North to South. 
Therefore, developed countries need to open their markets for easy access to the products of 
interest to the poor countries. As Obadan (2001b) has stressed, the industrial countries need to 
remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers to imports of goods in which Nigeria and other African 
countries have the greatest comparative advantage. 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
o  Globalization is not a new phenomenon. But it has intensified in its ramifications in the 
last two decades and attracted so much attention. It has remained a powerful force 
shaping world economies for good or for ill. 
o  As a multi-dimensional phenomenon, the political, social, cultural and environmental 
dimensions of globalization are no doubt important. But the economic aspect is perceived 
to be at the heart of the process with trade, finance, investment and technological flows as 
its key features. The financial aspects of globalization have turned out to be rather 
controversial. Many poor countries went through the process of financial liberalisation 
without adequate preparation and taking precautionary measures. And so, careless 
financial liberalisation has tended to be accompanied by grave risks and dangers of 
financial crisis. The poor countries, therefore, need to avoid premature liberalisation and 
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conditions.  
o  Some countries, particularly, the developed countries and newly industrialized 
developing countries, have succeeded in using the avenue provided by globalization to 
partake in the opportunities and benefits of greater integration with the global economy. 
But most of the poor countries have not been able to take full advantage of the 
opportunities of globalization or to participate in its benefits. These countries have very 
weak capacities to take advantage of global markets. African countries are still struggling 
to set up basic necessities in the area of infrastructure and trade capacity building.  
o  Besides, as primary commodity producers and exporters, African countries face a hostile 
international environment characterized by protectionism, fluctuations in commodity 
prices and declining terms of trade. Over the years, the leading industrial countries have 
exhibited double standards in their practice of free trade which neoclassical economics 
espouse. When it suits them, they practice protectionism which hurts the poor commodity 
exporting countries significantly. Under the circumstances, they are left with neither aid 
nor trade.  
o  Two things are thus imperative. One is the need for the developed countries to open their 
markets to the products from the poor countries, particularly those in which they have 
comparative advantage. The second is that while removing the obstacles to full 
participation by poor countries and poor people is essential to make globalization 
inclusive, African countries need to embrace the phenomenon in the full awareness of not 
only the opportunities but also the risks which include financial crises and aggravation of 
inequalities both between countries and within countries. 
o  Although the developing countries as a group have become more integrated with the 
global economy, Africa has not kept pace with the whole.  In other words, Africa is the 
least integrated with the world economy even though African economies are relatively 
more open. Thus, openness is not a sufficient condition for meaningful participation in 
the global economy. And it is hardly surprising that African countries have also reaped 
the least benefits in the spheres of trade, financial flows, growth and poverty reduction.  
In the continent, a worsening of existing imbalances has impeded development and 
worsened poverty. Growth has been very poor until the last few years and the continent is 
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marginalization. 
o  To meet the subsisting challenges and accelerate its integration with the world economy 
in a sensible way, Africa needs to: develop a strong production base predicated on value 
added exports; diversify export structures and develop manufactured export capability; 
develop adequate human and institutional capacity, physical infrastructures, capital and 
technology, etc, necessary for integration. It also needs to design and implement sound 
economic policies, as well as develop and operate within the framework of regional and 
sub-regional groupings. 
o  Openness and markets constitute the platform of globalization. But then, it appears that 
under globalization, the market, with all its imperfections, is being worshipped. Rather 
than the market being made to work for people, it has been the other way round with 
people working for the market. As I have argued, this is wrong because even though 
markets are important and market incentives can indeed be powerful, they are neither all-
pervasive, nor do they have answers to all economic problems. And, indeed, if left 
unchecked, markets, with all their limitations, can lead to deleterious outcomes. The 
inadequacies of the market in reality provide a basis for government intervention in free 
market economies. The invisible hand of the market must receive assistance from the 
visible hand of the government. The government needs to strengthen and complement the 
market rather than replace it. In Nigeria, this strengthening includes proper development 
planning. Even high-profile neoliberal economists have conceded that neoliberalism 
which is predicated on the market fundaentalism cannot provide an effective agenda for 
reducing poverty. 
o  Liberalisation is a key feature of globalization. In response to external pressures, the poor 
countries have undertaken widespread and rather ‘big-bang’ trade and financial 
liberalisation. But the liberalisation occurred without any prior preparations to ensure that 
domestic industries were ready to face exposure to international competition. And so, 
trade liberalisation has produced negative results for most of their economies including 
de-industrialization, or has marginalized them. While imports increased, exports failed to 
keep pace. The appropriate complement of prudential supervision of the financial sector 
often tended to be absent in financial liberalisation. There is thus the need for the poor 
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against the background of meeting the necessary macroeconomic and other pre-
conditions. Nigeria should be able to decide on the rate and scope of liberalisation and 
combine it with strategic protection of local industries and enterprises. 
o  In the specific case of Nigeria, the economy is relatively open and liberalized. Yet, it has 
not integrated with the world economy in any meaningful way. Its shares of world trade, 
global capital flows and world output are very low. The country’s export growth 
performance has been very poor compared to the achievements of some other developing 
countries. Also, a significant proportion of the capital inflows that Nigeria attracted is in 
the form of loans which the country mismanaged or diverted in the service of corruption, 
thus resulting in an external debt crisis and a debilitating debt burden. This burden tended 
to depress investment and reduce economic growth. Although, globalization has had 
some positive effects on the economy, especially through the oil sector, there seems to be 
a consensus that the positive impact has been negligible considering macroeconomic 
indicators such as growth, poverty and other social indicators. And so, Nigeria is not one 
of those successful newly globalizing cases as China, India, Singapore, Mexico that have 
shifted to manufactured exports and reduced poverty significantly. 
-  What then can Nigeria do? At this point in time, Nigeria cannot turn its back on 
globalization as autarky is not a viable option. Rather, the country must do what some 
other developing countries have done to participate meaningfully and beneficially in 
the globalization process so as to make it inclusive, growth enhancing and poverty-
reducing. This means adequate preparation of its economy, implementing sound and 
sensible policies, building capacity and ensuring appropriate government intervention 
in the economy.   
-  Finally, the industrial countries need to play a complementary role to the efforts of 
Nigeria and other poor countries to reap significant benefits from globalization. This 
they can do principally by opening their markets. The present Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) which the European Union is trying to impose on the poor 
countries in replacement of  the erstwhile EU – ACP Agreements (Lome 
Conventions) will further move the poor countries away from the benefits of 
globalization       
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Annex 1:  Classification of the World by Income 
Low Income  Armenia Belize  Greece 
Afghanistan Azerbaijan  Botswana  Greenland 
Bangladesh Belarus  Chile  Guam 
Benin  Bolivia  Costa Rica  Hong Kong, China 
Bhutan  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina Croatia Iceland 
Burkina Faso  Brazil  Czech Republic  Ireland 
Burundi  Bulgaria  Dominica  Isle of man 
Cambodia Cameroon  Equatorial  Guinea  Israel 
Central African Republic  Cape Verde  Estonia  Italy 
Chad China  Gabon Japan 
Comoros Colombia  Grenada  Korea,  Rep. 
Congo, Dem, Rep.  Congo, Rep.  Hungary  Kuwait 
Cote d’Ivoire  Cuba  Latvia  Liechtenstein 
Eritrea Djibouti Lebanon  Luxembourg 
Ethiopia  Dominican Republic  Libya  Macao, China 
Gambia, the  Ecuador  Lithuania  Malta 
Ghana  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Malaysia  Monaco 
Guinea El  Salvador  Mauritius Netherlands 
Guinea-Bissau Fiji  Mayotte  Netherlands  Antilles 
Haiti Georgia Mexico  New  Caledonia 
India Guatemala  Northern  Mariana Islands  New Zealand 
Kenya Guyana  Oman Norway 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  Honduras  Palau  Portugal 
Kyrgyz Republic  Indonesia  Panama  Puerto Rico 
Lao PDR  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Poland  Qatar 
Liberia Iraq  Romania  San  Marino 
Madagascar  Jamaica  Russian Federation  Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Malawi Jordan  Seychelles  Slovenia 
Mali Kazakhstan  Slovak  Republic  Spain 
Mauritania Kiribati  South  Africa Sweden 
Mongolia  Lesotho  St. Kitts and Nevis  Switzerland 
Mozambique Macedonia,  FYR  St.  Lucia  United Arab Emirates 
Myanmar  Maldives  St. Vincent and the  United Kingdom 
Nepal  Marshal island  Grenadines  United States 
Niger  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  Trinidad and Tobago  Virgin Islands (U.S) 
Nigeria Moldova  Turkey   
Pakistan Morocco Uruguay   
Papua New Guinea  Namibia  Venezuela, RB   
Rwanda  Nicaragua   
Sao Tome and Principe  Paraguay  High Income  
Senegal Peru  Andorra   
Sierra Leone  Philippines  Australia   
Solomon Islands  Samoa  Austria   
Somalia  Serbia and Montenegro  Bahamas, The   
Sudan Sri  Lanka  Bahrain   
Tajikistan Suriname  Belgium   
Tanzania Swaziland  Bermuda   
Timor-leste Syrian  Arab  Republic Brunei  Darussalam   
Togo Thailand  Canada   
Uganda Tonga  Cayman  Islands   
Uzbekistan Tunisia  Channel  Islands   
  111Vietnam Turkmenistan  Cyprus   
Yemen, Rep.  Ukraine  Denmark   
Zambia Vanuatu  Faeroe  Islands   
Zimbabwe  West Bank and Gaza  Finland   
   France  
Lower middle Income  Upper middle Income  French Polynesia   
Albania American  Samoa  Germany   
Algeria  Argentina   
Angola  Barbados   
 
Source: World  Bank.  World Development Indicators, 2007. 
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